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HCI as Art has the problem of conceptualising the work of art itself (the application) and the experience of the person, engaging with the work of art (the user). There is no general consensus about how to conceptualise either. However, I was lucky enough to come across an interesting example of the latter.

The example appears in a paper (in preparation), written by John Salisbury. The application is video games. Grounded Theory is used, based on interviews, to claim that: ‘ players engage with games, if they can find a sense of net personal cultural value, as they select, play and reflect on their play experiences.’

There is no consensus in the Fine Arts (or elsewhere, for that matter), as to whether video games can be counted as an art form. Some claim that they are a type of service, whose aim is to entertain. Elsewhere, it is argued that video games are made up of artistic elements (images, text, speech etc), in the manner of ‘performance art’. This in not the place to attempt to arbitrate between these different claims.

Whatever their status as art, there can be no doubting that video games engage the user. Further, characterising that engagement might be of interest and of use to design researchers, attempting to develop HCI as Art. ‘Net personal cultural value’ seems to me to be a concept worth persuing. I encourage researchers to take a look at the paper.

My comments are based on the different frameworks, proposed here.

Introduction to the Paper

John Salisbury was a 1999/2000 MSc student in Ergonomics. He took the HCI Option. He was a serious, independent student with his own ideas and the spirit to defend them. No surprise, then, when he completed a PhD last year at Middlesex University. Its title is: ‘Playing with Value: Player Engagements with Videogames as a Negotiation of Net Cultural Worth’. A touching acknowledgement to my own commitment to theory was enough to endear me to the research, in spite of its unfamiliar domain.

John and I subsequently exchanged e-mails about his work and in particular about a paper ‘in preparation’, reporting some of his research. I offered to review the paper for this website, provided John made a specific request, which follows:

Review Request

John Hi!

This is a review request for my paper ‘Engagement as a process of Seeking Cultural Value’. The paper is in preparation, Version 1. I have some concerns, before proceeding to Version 2.

First, how to balance the methodology and its epistemological basis with the fit and relevance of the resulting theory, in favour of the latter? For example, I could make more references to other work, employing grounded Theory (so making the application thereof less susceptible to focus and criticism).

Second, other work may not be well enough integrated into the body of the theoretical outline, so making my results appear less convincing. Additional examples from my data might help here.

There are likely to be other issues of concern and I request that the aim of the review should be to expose such issues. I understand that my request and your review will be posted on the HCI Engineering website. However, the status of my paper as in ‘In preparation, Version 1 should be made explicit. Further, the version should not be cited without my prior consent. The IPR status of the paper is unchanged by its appearance on the website. Finally, there is no obligation on me to follow any suggestions made in the review, although I shall be pleased to reflect thereon in a manner consistent with the making of this request.

Thanks in advance – John Salisbury

Videogame Engagement as a Process of Seeking Cultural Value

Empirical investigations of videogame play and videogame engagement are often delimited along demographic or genre lines. This paper summarizes an attempt to generate a theory of videogame play and engagement which is not restricted to arbitrary factors of types of players or types of games. In order to achieve this theory a version of Classic Grounded Theory (Glaser 1978) was employed.

The result reveals a highly generalized theory: that players engage with games if they can find a sense of net personal cultural value as they select, play and reflect on their play experiences. The theory is presented and explained and the contributing hypotheses are also presented and explained.

In conclusion it is felt that the methodology has produced a theory with reasonable fit and relevance, suggesting some utility to the fields of Game Design and Videogame Research. Further work is suggested which will clarify and possibly modify the theory to increase the perceived fit, relevance, and utility.

Categories and Subject Descriptors: K.8.0 [Personal Computing]: General

General Terms: Games

Additional Key Words and Phrases: engagement, qualitative analysis, flow, fun, videogames, identity, culture, Pragmatism, Grounded Theory Methodology

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper summarises the findings of a research programme that set out to empirically create a theory relating to individuals’ experiences of videogame playing.

John Long Comment 1

1. Discipline and Discipline Problem

1.1 Research Problem

The paper fails to declare to which discipline, it is intended to contribute by way of the knowledge (‘theory’) it has acquired. It opts for the more general notion of ‘field’, which may be covered by a number of different disciplines, all with their own concepts and criteria etc. As a result researchers are unclear what to take away from the paper (what sort of ‘theory’ is being reported; what could/should be done with it?) and how to build on the research by way of extension, replication or validation. For those, who do not want to commit to the notion of ‘discipline’, ‘approach’ might be an alternative, provided it is made explicit enough for researchers to make a judgement as to how to take the research forward. With the same proviso, ‘following the model or method of another researcher’ might be yet another alternative and indeed even ‘my way’.

1.2. Illustrated Research Solution

Declare the paper’s related discipline/approach/model or method/way etc and its associated problem. Purely, as an illustration, the discipline might be science (Psychology perhaps) and its discipline problem one of understanding (here gaming/videogaming behaviour) by explaining the data collected (usually on the basis of an existing theory or somesuch) and predicting other data (on the basis of the theory being proposed). Alternatively, the discipline/approach/model or method/way etc might be engineering (for example, gaming/videogaming HCI behaviour) with a view to diagnosing and solving design problems (as in ‘gaming design’) by the use of models and methods or other forms of HCI design knowledge. Comparable research solutions could be constructed for other applications.

End Comment 1

With the perspective that many contemporary empirical theories are too narrow in focus (e.g. Malone 1981 studied only elementary school children) , methodologically inappropriate (e.g. Sweetser and Johnson 2004 report having based part of their work on a “Grounded Theory” analysis of a 4 participant focus group), or place undue weight on folk developed assumptions (e.g. Brown and Cairns 2004 seem to take as their starting point that “immersion” is the ultimate objective of videogame players) and that a data driven approach with minimal a priori assumptions relating to types of games, types of players, or proposed engagements and objectives might have a chance of arriving at a useful theory with broad applicability, a data-driven methodology was selected, interpreted and employed.

Comment 2

The concepts of ‘theory’ and ‘methodology’ here could be set up using the concepts proposed in Comment 1. This additional specification, if carried through into the rest of the paper, should help clarify for researchers how to balance the methodology and its epistemological basis with the fit and relevance of the resulting theory, in favour of the latter (John’s first concern). Also, how other work might be better integrated into the body of the theoretical outline (John’s second concern).

End Comment 2

The methodology employed was an interpretation of Glaser’s (1978) Classic Grounded Theory Methodology (CGT), as Glaser positions CGT as a methodology that, if applied correctly, should produce a global dependant variable or central hypothesis supported by contributing variables and sub-hypotheses in a data-driven or empirical manner, that should account for most of the variation found in data related to the domain of study. As this methodology was employed then the resulting theory is a highly generalised concept accounting for players’ reported experiences of engaging with videogames, but with a systematic connection to sub-hypotheses and ultimately data related to the domain. It is hoped that in ‘grounding’ the hypotheses in information about our chosen domain that the theory developed can clearly account for the domain rather than account for arbitrary or ‘grand’ theory.

Comment 3

If the theory provides an ‘account of the domain’, as stated, this is consistent with the account being a scientific (or scientific-like) one -see also Comment 1.

End Comment 3

Sections later in this paper summarise the resulting global hypothesis and the sub-hypotheses that contribute to it, and in order that the reader is clear about how this theory was derived the following section explains the particular interpretation of Classic Grounded Theory (CGT) employed. The concluding sections of this paper explore if the utility of the theory with respect to the fields of videogame design and player research, and if such a general theory or the supporting hypotheses can be further modified or reformulated to be of greater utility to interested audiences and if so how. These concluding sections also attempt to place the theory in a broader theoretical context.

Ultimately, the contribution of this work is felt to sit in 2 areas. The first is in applying CGT in a domain quite different from those it might normally be applied to.

Comment 4

2. Method Problem

2.1 Research Problem

It is unclear what the product of the research is, concerning the Grounded Theory method, and so what researchers are intended to take away from the paper and how they might build on the research.

2.2 Illustrated Research Solution.

A number of possible solutions suggest themselves, concerning the GTM:

(a) Evaluate the GTM, that is, does it do what it claims to do and how well?

(b) Declare any difficulties experienced in applying the GTM correctly.

(c) Identify the actual GTM concepts used with respect to the total set of concepts. Provide a rationale for those concepts used and those concepts not used.

End Comment 4

The other main contribution is to forcefully express the general hypothesis that players are seeking culturally expressed value though cycles of positive and negative identification with videogame play experiences, and that this value sum drives engagement.

Comment 5

3. Theory Problem

3.1 Research Problem

The status of the theory is unclear and so how it might be carried forward and built on by other researchers. The problem is related also to the Discipline Problem – see Comment 1 earlier.

3.2 Illustrated Research Solutions

(a) One view of theory validation is: conceptualise; operationalise; test; and generalise (Long, 1997). This research may have ‘conceptualised’ the theory. The theory, then, could be recast in terms of a model, which other researchers could operationalise, test and generalize and so develop it further. Even a declaration of the theory/model’s concepts would be a valuable outcome.

(b) Perhaps the theory is in a pre-conceptual stage. In this case, an initial conceptual model could be constructed and reported and other researchers could advance the conceptualisation.

End Comment 5

2. INTERPRETATION OF CGT METHODOLOGY AS EMPLOYED

2.1 Overview of Grounded Theory

For various reasons the term Grounded Theory (GT) is applied to multiple research perspectives, including a form of analysis applied to qualitative data (e.g. Sweetser and Johnson 2004) or a means of analysing the behavior of individuals relative to a specific hypothesis (Brown and Cairns 2004; Fabricatore, Nussbaum, and Rosas 2002), delimiting the domain according to a priori hypotheses about what is important. Early in the programme of research which forms the basis of this paper the decision was made to understand the methodology in the broadest sense, and hopefully to develop a theory inductively (though perhaps more accurately abductively) derived from the domain of people playing videogames. This ‘inductive’ approach is most forcefully expressed by one of the co-originators of the term ‘Grounded Theory’, Barney Glaser (BG Glaser and Strauss 1967; BG Glaser 1978; B Glaser 1992).

Comment 6

See Comment 4.

End Comment 6

In this version of GT no a priori hypotheses are formed, as the objective of the methodology is to form hypotheses based on available data rather than to validate existing theory. In order to achieve hypotheses about the domain a methodology encompassing data collection, data analysis, and theory formulation is proposed.

Comment 7

The expression ‘validating existing theory’ is relevant to Comment 1.

End Comment 7

There are several methods within the methodology, and the understanding of those methods as they have been applied in this research are summarized here in order that the reader can both understand where the theoretical concepts came from and how this research might be differentiated from other similarly labeled work.

There are 5 methods or activities which make up the CGT methodology:

• Data collection

• Comparative coding

• Theoretical ‘memoing’

• Sorting

• Writing

Each method is intended to move the research from information about a domain to a coherent theory about what is going on in that domain.

Comment 8

Distinguish description/representation (of a domain) from theory. See also Comment 5.

End Comment 8

These methods are not linear, sequential activities but methods which apply in different proportion at different times. The following subsections will describe how and when they are used while also describing how these methods were employed in the research described in this paper.

For reasons of brevity no attempt will be made in the following text to explore the merits of the methodology from an epistemological basis, rather the following subsections are provided to allow the reader a means of evaluating how the theory was derived in order to differentiate this research from other similar attempts. For a critique of the Grounded Theory methodology see Bryant (2007).

Comment 9

Criteria for evaluating the theory in this way would be useful here for other researchers.

End Comment 9

2.2 Data Collection Method

Any information which is directly collected from the domain of study or is unequivocally concerned with that domain is useful and should be included. So where the thoughts and actions of people are concerned we might include formal interviews, informal conversations, focus groups, overheard conversations, diaries, and possibly observations, or applicable statistics, while other less textual sources might also provide useful insights. Deciding what to collect and when to use it is determined by the shape and direction of the current theory and progress of coding and memoing (see below). This ‘theoretical sampling’ approach helps to provide a degree of parsimony in the amount of data collected, as in linking data collection to data analysis and theory formation helps to ensure that only as much data will be collected as required. Relative to the process of coding (below) there are essentially two types of targets for sampling: ‘new’ kinds of case (by which we hope to generate new codes) and ‘similar’ kinds of case (by which we hope to flesh out the properties of existing codes).

The research reported in this research started by interviewing by opportunity (friends, relatives and colleagues), attempted to explore diary and observation data, further interviewed specific individuals (non-players, more ‘casual’ or more ‘hardcore’ players, and an increasing number of strangers with disparate tastes ), and included a few field noted observations about overheard and informal conversations. The total number of individuals who contributed either distinct codes or an illustration for a particular memo (post coding) was in the order of the mid 30s. The data was in the form of transcribed interviews, recorded but un-transcribed interviews, recorded observations, and field notes (the diaries proved unproductive).

Comment 10

Some might consider this form of data collection to be ‘informal’ or somesuch. John needs to categorise it at least in some way (acceptable to himself). There are two reasons. First, other researchers need to know for the purpose or inadvisability of replication. Second, its status will necessarily determine the status of the resulting theory. See also Comment 15.

End Comment 10

2.3 Comparative Coding Method

The GT methodology grew out of research by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967) which utilized a process they knew as ‘Constant Comparison’. This process is advocated as the coding method for CGT by Glaser (1978). The codes generated in CGT then are initially derived from comparing data to data. If an apparent part of the data appears to have a relationship with some other part then the nature of this relationship is noted as a code. Most simply then, codes are categories of data or properties of already identified categories. At a more complex level codes can be compared themselves producing meta or ‘theoretical’ codes. Coding is an attempt to reframe raw data, making the theory fit multiple cases rather than single interesting occurrences.

Codes were created in two ways in the research reported here, early in the programme transcriptions of the data were marked with subjective observations, which further into the programme (once the constant comparative emphasis was more clearly understood) were clustered into categories and properties which were subsequently added to in further iterations in the constant comparative manner described above. Few theoretical codes were created, but rather theoretical memos were created which accounted for the comparisons between existing codes. This way of coding with memos rather than specific theoretical codes was due in part to the software employed (Atlas.ti Anon. 1993), which made comparative codes or properties, and especially theoretical codes of codes, a little tricky, but in using memos to create theoretical codes rather than a specific ‘theoretical code’ facility of the supporting software, the result is assumed to be the same.

2.4 Theoretical Memoing Method

In the jargon of GT ‘memoing’ is the activity of interest, the main material of the methodology if you will. As the researcher iteratively collects data and codes it, and as they sort and write their outputs they should be constantly capturing each hypothesis they have about what it all means and how it all fits together. This central act of memoing drives every other activity. The researcher finds what to sample for next based on their theoretical observations about the codes they have generated, when to stop collecting and coding data based on how their memos are filling out, and it is the memos which are arranged (and further complemented) in the sorting process, which then yields a structured collection of memoed theoretical ideas to be written.

Memos are critical to two milestones found in the methodology. At some point the researcher will come to believe that their data collection and coding seem to be about a particular code. As the memos coalesce about this code the researcher will come to conclude that they may have identified what the domain may be about (in the jargon of the methodology they have identified the ‘core category’). Once this milestone is met the research moves from collecting data and coding openly for all possibilities and starts collecting data and coding specifically to selectively generate theoretical ideas about this code. The stopping rule for these selective iterations of coding is that once the researcher is no longer generating any new theoretical ideas they might be said to have theoretically saturated the core code. That is not to say that new codes might not be being generated by further iterations, but that as the researcher continues to sample, in accordance with their emerging theory new codes are interchangeable with old. Thus listing out all possible types of subject, perspective, context, tool, strategy, or whatever is not the point and developing categories of only those things that contribute to the emerging theory in terms of new theoretical ideas are important features in ensuring that the theory is developed parsimoniously. We might also say that in recognizing that not every case can be included we are leaving opportunity for any resulting hypothesis to be logically falsifiable.

This research recorded theoretical memos in the appropriate function of the software employed. Generally these memos consisted of short notes about what the codes might represent, as well as relationships between codes and possible targets for data collection. The core category selected for saturation by selective coding related to players’ felt identities and how these identities manifested as roles through which the player ascribed value to different game features. Memos were also raised relating these ideas to general theories drawn primarily from Social Psychology where appropriate, especially during selective coding and sorting. As explained below, the sorting process showed this concept of valorization of game features according to a player’s self sense to be somewhat inadequate in accounting for all the theoretical ideas raised, and as such was duly extended.

Comment 11

The reference to Social Psychology should be understood in relation to the issues raised in Comment 1.

End Comment 11

2.5 Memo Sorting Method

Once the core category is felt to be suitably saturated, the collection of memos is not expected to be in a state that would allow for immediate publication, rather while most of the memos are expected to implicitly relate to the core category or how the core category explicitly relates to others, these relations are likely to lack a structure suitable for writing up into a clear publication. There are likely to be gaps and inconsistencies which will need to be dealt with before writing can happen, if one intends to present a coherent theory rather than an incoherent collection of observations. Sorting then is the process of creating a framework for the intended dissemination of the research findings and is performed in order to make as many of the theoretical ideas work towards explaining the derivation of the core hypothesis as possible.

It is likely that new comparisons will be noticed in the act of sorting and as such the process of memoing continues throughout. It is also possible that gaps exist that require some further rounds of data collection and selective coding. It is also possible that the core hypothesis may well need modifying in order to account for more of the theoretical ideas and codes than previously realised. In this sense sorting is critical and is not entirely equivalent to the process of expounding generalised observations which often occurs in ethnographic work (e.g. Carr 2005).

In this research the pre-sort core category which related to a players sense of identity and assumed socio-cultural role relative to game features was felt to be somewhat inadequate, in that that concept failed to account for the mass of data, codes and thus theoretical ideas relating to the cyclical process of engagement. As such the sort revealed that it was more reasonable to talk of players’ cycles of identifying with games at a feature level, which is the theory presented here. The sort was physically accomplished by printing out the electronically captured memos, complimented by hand written memos which were raised during the sort, which were repeatedly placed into piles until almost every memo was included and a writable structure of chapters and subdivisions was visible.

2.6 Theory Writing Method

After sorting, writing then is not the process of structuring an argument as much as it is the process of laying out the sorted theoretical memos in a text, ensuring that the connections and derivations are made clear for the reader. Also in this process other theories are related to the presented theory (which is also possible in the sort, where general theoretical ideas might help to contextualise the saturated theory).

As such the reader can assume that the sections of this paper that set out the theory are in fact directly representative of the sorted memos expanded upon and linked; this paper being a summary of a much more comprehensive thesis which literally contains all the expounded memos.

Comment 12

This expose is very clear to the reader at this level of abstraction. However, an example pulled through would help understanding of what John actually did. However, given the complexity of the process, it is unclear whether such illustration is possible. This comment is included for reflection.

End Comment 12

Comment 13

See Comment 4. The expose could identify all GTM concepts on their their first appearance. The list of used and unused concepts and the rationale for the difference could be part of a GTM evaluation and an output from the research. This addresses John’s first concern; but not in the way he envisages.

End Comment 13

3. The Developed theory

Comment 14

See Comment 5.

End Comment 14

As proposed above, the following subsections represent the theoretical memos as an integrated text, with reference to specific data where necessary (and as space allows). Starting with the contributing hypotheses and leading to the composite or core hypothesis will hopefully allow the reader a means to evaluate the theory clearly that a top down presentation might obscure.

3.1 Process of Engagement

A major observation to make about player engagement is that it apparently does not happen as a singular event. The following subsection expands on the interim report published XXXXXX in which an early understanding of the methodology and early findings was published. The following differs from that published work in that the phases or stages were slightly different in the XXXX publication. What is common is that there is a phase of engagement that occurs before play, and the difference between the two presentations is due to greater saturation and borne out of a formal sorting process.

Essentially this sub-hypothesis is that there are 3 indistinct phases of engagement: Selection (before hands-on interaction); Play (actual hands-on interaction); and Reflection.

3.1.1 Selection

The mechanisms employed to select games are complex and depend on the particular individual and their sense of identifications. Tying the cycle of engagements to the sense of identity will be explored later in this report, in the section dealing with the core hypothesis. This sub-section and the sub-sections relating to playing and reflecting will focus on generalized patterns and procedures employed by individuals as they engage with a proposition.

Selection itself can be broken down into broad strategies, situated within contexts:

3.1.1.1 Selection of the singular activity of ‘videogame play’

Firstly we can talk of prospective players selecting videogame play, in current forms, as a potentially agreeable activity. This global point of selection can be best seen in the attitudes of those who reject videogame playing outright. Such individuals expressed attitudes suggesting that for some videogaming represents a male, juvenile, sedentary and solitary activity which is not for them, seeing themselves as variously adult, active, social and not male individuals. While some interest was expressed in novel developments in the products which militate the existing perceptions of gaming (primarily Nintendo’s attempts at introducing motion control and marketing which focused on social settings and players who were not necessarily male or juvenile), the non-gamer subjects had not made the investment of time, money, or effort in exploring these possibilities.

For those individual who had not rejected videogame play outright the data reveals a number of strategies employed and perspectives on what videogame activities they might actively seek. These selection criteria reach into a huge range of potentials for play, and are not simply the user finding an agreeable narrative or representation which is might be an easy assumption to make (Juul 2010). The following subsections explore some of the ‘whats’ or pre-play engagements made based on activities sought and some of the ‘hows’ or strategies employed in ascertaining these potentials. These factors will be revisited when discussing the derivation of the core hypothesis, later in this paper.

3.1.1.2 Selecting for an explicit context

Games are not played in a laboratory environment; they are played in a real-world context. Potential players often account for potential contexts of play and select games based upon those contexts. The data relating to the ways players recognize possible contexts of play before actual play occurs seem to be driven by primarily social factors.

That isn’t to say that prospective players are always seeking experiences which they can share with others, though this is not uncommon. Prospective players also recognize that there may be occasions when they might want an involving experience requiring an extensive commitment in terms of time and concentration possibly during unavoidable periods of solitude. In this sense a player might be looking to become ‘immersed’ in a game (though the term ‘immersion’ was only used by a single individual in this research) as a means of passing the time or avoiding boredom. These ‘anti-social’ sentiments are not shared by all; other subjects suggested that recognizing the potential commitment necessary in order to play certain types of games is the reason that they reject many videogaming activities, preferring to invest these resources in more ‘productive’ pursuits; a sentiment which will also be covered in more depth in later sections.

More social contexts are selected for when a player can imagine playing a game in the presence of or along with other players. As such a prospective player might select a game with performance or multi-player features. While a player might never actually get chance to play the game as a performance, or collaborate or compete with their peers, that a game provides the possibility is often a positive factor. Recognizing the possible tastes of witnesses or co-players is important in helping the prospective player determine the value of the game for social play, which will also be explored in the section of this paper which deals with ‘kinds of players’.

3.1.1.3 Selecting Specific Features

In selecting for a specific context we might expect a prospective player to be investigating the purported features of a game. Features which have a bearing on suitable contexts are not the only ones noticed. Prospective players explicitly or implicitly consider a great many design features. While ‘surface’ features are commonly attended to as suggested by Juul’s suggestion that a prospective player is first drawn to the ‘fiction’ of a game (2010), respondents also discussed ‘deeper’ features such as the type of challenge offered. One specific subject explicitly stated that he would eschew any game which might test his dexterity, preferring to engage in intellectual puzzles instead. Interviewees expressed such targets as graphical style and quality, game mechanics, activities including any overarching story or narrative, and challenge type. In fact it seems that any designed feature may be noted by a prospective player and used as a means of differentiation between possible offerings.

3.1.1.4 Selecting the Familiar

Selecting games according to familiarities seems to operate in two ways, selecting familiar game related features and selecting according to features not immediately related to games.

When a prospective player is selecting features based on their past experience of playing other games they are clearly drawing on their reflections about past experiences of play. This construction of predispositions is also noted by Carr (2005), and might be said to have been predicted by Pragmatist theories of engaging with pleasurable artifacts such as those of Dewey (1934). This act of selecting a game which promises experiences similar to those enjoyed in the past might account for the success of sequels, though obviously not all reflections are positive and can thus turn a prospective player off a certain set of features as well as on to them.

Another interesting facet of selecting according to the player’s past experiences is where a prospective player selects a videogame based on factors external to their videogaming experience. This is usually in the prospective player identifying with the subject matter (or fiction) offered by the game and may account for the successes of sports related properties and games based on films and television series. That is if a player feels that they are a fan of Football or Batman say, then they are more likely engage with games which include such themes. This principle can also act in the opposite direction, with familiar themes that the individual does not identify with acting to drive down the degree of engagement a prospective player has with the concept. For example, one interviewee expressed a dislike of Boxing as a justification for not liking beat-em-up style games. In fact he expressed that he was not someone who enjoys watching Boxing and so wouldn’t be someone who would like fighting games, which seems to be a sophisticated expression of identity, which will be covered later in this paper.

3.1.1.5 Selection Based on Trusted Opinion

The previous sub-sections dealt with what kinds of things prospective players might be evaluating as they select games to play. The following subsections deal with how prospective players get their impressions of games they haven’t yet played.

A clear source of information about what a game is like to play is to consult the opinions of those that have already played it. These opinions could be obtained from peers, reviews in the media, or other ‘expert’ opinion. In social groups where games and game play was seen as a valid topic of conversation information gleaned from the opinions of peers was most valued. However several subjects suggested that gaming was not often a valid topic of conversation, and so one of these subjects had formed a relationship with a clerk in his local game shop where the clerk had learned his tastes to such a degree that he trusted the clerk’s recommendations. Where media reviews were concerned, among the subjects that suggested that they did read such things there was a general impression that they were not as well trusted as peer recommendation, but were never the less used as a source of information about the features and overall quality of a game.

3.1.1.6 Selections Based on Marketing

Information sourced directly from the producers or publishers of videogames is another means by which potential players find out if a game might offer a suitable play experience. This could be information from the company websites of the game producing or publishing companies, media advertisements, media preview editorials, or even the game packaging. The amount of information sources consulted seems to loosely correlate with how much the prospective player identifies themselves as a game player. ‘Hardcore’ players may be aware of release dates and proposed features at a fairly fine grained level, while data from players at the other end of the hobby/commitment spectrum suggests that these players might only consult the game packaging as they browse games in a retail outlet.

The extent to which the player has investigated the promised features of a game may well influence their commitment at later phases of the engagement process. For example a player who might describe themselves as ‘hardcore’ who has tracked the development of a game from announcement through to sale, and who may well have engaged in the online fan community concerned with that specific offering, discussing hopes and fears for the final product, is less likely to give the game 2 minutes of their time before permanently deleting it from their hard disk (as the subject who downloaded games based on their title alone suggested he would).

That some less hobbyist players select games based on packaging, more often than not, suggests that they have very little understanding of the features of a game other than a theme and the positive description of the features commonly summarized on the packaging. The subjects who suggested that packaging information was their primary source of information seemed to select games by their theme (or ‘fiction’) more than any other features, even though this had in the past lead to disappointing play experiences.

3.1.1.7 Selection by Provenance

Where a game comes from can provide important information to a prospective player in helping them determine if it might be engaging. That is information about who made or published the game or who owns a copy of the game or gaming product can push up or pull down the engagement a player has with a game before they play it. If the game was developed by a team responsible for games that the prospective player is fond of, or the game is found in the collection of a friend the prospective player considers to have good taste, then the player is more likely to be engaged by the prospect of the game. Conversely if the game is developed or published by a company the prospective player considers to be producers of bad games or the game is found in the collection of someone considered to have a poor taste in games, then this provenance might act to drive down the individual’s engagement with the prospect of playing the game. Those prospective players who might describe themselves as gamers are more likely to know who produced a game and judge it on this knowledge, but such knowledge is also held, to some degree, by those who play more casually. For example one ‘casual’ subject suggested that Nintendo are more likely to produce games which are more aligned to what they are personally seeking than other publishers. Less hobbyist or ‘hardcore’ players are likely to trade games amongst their peers as a means of determining quality, essentially pooling agreeable games.

3.1.1.8 Selection by Availability

Often players might make no conscious decision to obtain a game; it is simply there. In this case the only decision the prospective player must make is whether to ‘have a go’ or not. In these cases many of the material costs are removed (such as time, effort or money spent to obtain the game) and the decision then only rests on whether the user feels that there might be other costs involved (embarrassment at playing a performance game in public say) relative to the benefits of playing (using our performance game example they might feel that in playing they become more socially connected to the other players). Where the context is less social (for example where the game is obtained cheaply, maybe as a bundled software product with a new device), the low cost of entry might have the player ‘give it a go’ where otherwise they might not. Judgment and engagement then rests on the later phases of engagement.

3.1.1.9 Selection by Trying

All other selection methods and criteria considered, there will be a point where the player starts playing the game. At this point engagement seems to go through a period of evaluation. Does the game meet up to expectations?

There is no clear cut off between a player’s initial evaluation and when they might be said to be playing ‘properly’, but there is enough evidence in the data to suggest that on occasion players have tried a game, decided that it wasn’t for them and stopped playing forever. Sometimes this is because they have encountered a game in a context that is not conducive to them seeing the benefits of continued play (such as one subject feeling that a game was far too hard to bother with having encountered it with players who were far more skilled than themselves and thus he became frustrated with his lack of skill), but more often it is simply that a game didn’t deliver what the prospective player imagined it might before they actually sat down to play it. Sometimes a player has minimal expectations and finds pleasure in their initial encounters. Sometimes though this pleasure is context dependant (such as individuals who wouldn’t normally play games, joining in with a group playing a game conducive to multi-player, party like activities), and once that context doesn’t exist anymore nor will they play anymore.

Occasionally though the player will find enough of what they thought they might get from the experience to remain engaged and to continue playing.

3.1.2 Play

While researchers such as Aarseth (Aarseth 2003) have argued that play must be the central object of study for games research, this project has essentially settled on a study of the conditions supporting engagement in play. That is the actual act of playing is bound into a social psychological praxis which informs the conditions of engagement; the actual engagement itself being a successful realization of the supporting factors of identification, expectation, context and so on. This is due in part to the differences in methodology, where the methodology used here deals with the heterophenomenology of reported player experiences Aarseth has traditionally focused on the artifact and their imputed meanings explored via personal play. That is much games research deals with the game and how it facilitates play while this research has developed a theory of how and why players make the choices they do; what experiences do games provide vs what kinds of experiences are players seeking to engage in. These are two sides of the same question.

As part of the process of selection, play and then reflection, the actual playing of the game is most simply stated as the period where a player considers them self to be an active player of the game. What factors hold them there for a session, or has the individual return for another session of play, are dealt with more completely in other sections of this paper. In terms of the phased process of engagement similar factors to those involved in game selection are constantly evaluated against the specific variable context during play, and if the weight of those factors becomes insufficiently positive then the player will stop playing. For example if the social situation changes to one that is insufficiently agreeable then the play may well stop to accommodate this change. Similarly other less dramatic changes might amass to stop play such as fatigue or hunger, or a player might have other concerns such as chores or work the time for which the play activities might be eating into. This is also alongside the possible changes within the game. The game might become too repetitive or too challenging for the player’s current state of mind, and this too will drive down the motivation to continue to play.

The conception of the motivations and de-motivations to play a specific game presented here is different from other conceptions which focus on such motivations as ‘immersion’ (Brown and Cairns 2004) or Flow (Cowley et al. 2008) as the ideas presented here should also account for players who are not looking for such deeply engaging experiences, as well as those that are. Indeed the data collected suggests that some players who have experienced the effects of ‘immersion’ or Flow like experiences in the past now reject many games or gameplaying contexts as they feel that losing track of time (say) with a game is more destructive and futile than beneficial and productive. As such some players deliberately seek out games which are not likely to take hours of their life at a time; games which are easy to pick up and put down.

3.1.3 Reflection

A player who has selected a game to play and has played it may continue to engage with the game afterwards. This engagement will take the form of explicit or implicit reflection. The player will be considering if playing that game was a positive or negative experience. They might even discuss the merits of the game amongst their social group. Indeed much of the data used in this research is essentially the reflections of players. It is apparent that while a player may select a game experience and play it, they might decide, on reflection that the experience overall is not worth repeating. Other non-negative reflections are related to the relative merits of particular games and will result in realizations which are fed back into future selections. Precisely what is being reflected on is explored in the following sections.

3.2 Identification with features

In the previous sections regarding the cycle of engagement a few hints are given as to what drives player engagement in this process. In general terms it seems that for each feature at each phase of the engagement the individual is determining if they are the ‘kind of person’ who might engage in such a game with such a feature. This identification operates for multiple pertinent features and seems to be summed or massed for any whole product. This sub-hypothesis then should help us understand how different people engage in different games, as if a player feels at any point that their perception of the fiction, graphical presentation, challenge type, and other features results in an overall positive engagement then they will be likely to play, where as if the same features are perceived, in summation, negatively then they are not likely to play.

One powerful example of how features are perceived in a socially relative personal way is of the adolescent subject who extensively played a certain JRPG (or Japanese Role-Playing Game) but felt the ‘super-deformed’ graphical style employed in much of the game was ‘babyish’. That is he seemed to feel that the graphical style was more suited to an audience younger than himself, but in summation the other features of the experience were sufficiently aligned to his cultural understanding of who he was and what he should be playing, to allow him to engage with the game despite the ‘babyish’ graphics.

What is also apparent from the data is that different individuals perceive the importance of features differently in terms of the weight they ascribe to these features. For example while one individual finds a degree of difficulty which will challenge their skills off-putting other players will deliberately play a game at its hardest setting as a personal challenge and would become fed up with a game at which they were always successful. I have related these weighted positives and negatives to a loose conception of ‘costs’ and ‘returns’. Costs might be loosely separated into material costs (money, space, portability, time commitment required) and social or cultural costs (is there a sense that in playing this I will perceive myself badly or I will be perceived badly by others in this context). Returns might be that a player is obtaining a ‘fun’ experience, whatever the particular user deems an acceptably fun experience to be (getting some exercise, inspiration, obtaining knowledge about the state of the art, experiencing an interesting narrative, and immersing oneself in an alternative world were examples encountered). Material returns are less difficult to suggest that they used to be. With the relatively recent introduction of motion control it seems that some players are interested in the fitness aspect which is used to market some products. Similarly self improvement and mental agility training game types are also apparently popular, suggesting that some players are looking for extrinsic returns such as enhanced mental fitness. This cost/benefit aspect of engagement suggests that the degree of overall engagement with a product could be said to be an aggregation of feature relative positions, or a summation of costs and returns to a net sum of overall ‘cultural’ (socially relative, personally expressed) value.

This socially developed sense of ‘kinds of people’ and what behavior is acceptable for such, which feeds into the cost/benefit sum, could be related to such Pragmatist ideas as Cooley’s ‘Looking Glass Self’ (1902); the theory that an individual’s sense of self is constructed by subjective reasoning about how the individual imagines they might be perceived by others in their society or immediate social context. We might say that so constructed the individual will behave in a way that seeks to reinforce this identity and seek to minimize any possibilities that they might be perceived poorly. We could also suggest that these expressions are expressions of cultural values (where an individual has learned suitable modes of conduct from their social interactions). That is not to say that an individual will embody all socially dictated grand cultural values (such as an abhorrence of murder say), though some of these types of value might impinge on some players’ engagement (and as such some players will state that they are uncomfortable playing a game where one plays at murder) but personally acquired, fine grained values (such as playing a game with cartoony graphics will reflect badly on an adolescent boy, but may reflect less badly on a woman in her 20s, or even that owning the latest videogame console reflects badly on a male dancer in his late 20s who believes that games are for dullards or a fashionable, female student in her teens who believes that games are for boys, but a technology savvy male, computing student in his 20s will feel remiss if he didn’t live in a house with all the latest hardware).

3.3 Value Seeking Process

In combination the hypotheses set out in the above sections suggest that players are engaging with games as collections of features with ascribed cultural value which are constantly evaluated and negotiated and the values summed throughout a course of engagement, from before the game is actively played, through active playing, to reflecting on the experience. The sense of cultural value is realized as a type of socially relative personal identification. So when an individual asks “Am I the kind of person who would play this game?” they are also asking “If I play this game, what does that say about me?” and “If I saw someone playing this game, what would that tell me about them?”, quite similar to Cooley’s ‘looking Glass self. So at each phase of engagement these implicit questions are being asked in slightly different ways.

3.3.1 Selection as investigating and finding potential positive cultural value

The space of potential gameplay offerings is not fully known by any individual, rather they form impressions of what offerings exist and what the nature of those offerings are from a variety of sources. These impressions are then contrasted with their sense of identification to determine if this activity is possibly one in which the individual feels that they can engage. The source of the information also helps to form this sense of identification, and the impression of the offering might not be formed simply on surface features such as themes, graphics, or characters, but at this stage, for many individuals, these features are more important here than they are at other phases of the engagement. The sources of information and methods used are those discussed in the relevant sub-sections above.

Essentially if an individual is sufficiently engaged by the prospect and can reconcile the investments required to play the game then they might seek it out and play it. If the investments are too great then they will play it if the investments are reduced, but otherwise will not seek it out (they are the kind of person who would play a game with those features in principle, but there is not enough time, it would be a waste of money, or it’s not worth upgrading hardware for are stated examples). If an individual is not engaged by the prospect of playing that game, then they will not seek it out or be inclined to play it without a context where the previously considered features become less relevant (not wanting to seem a ‘kill joy’ if everyone else in a social setting is playing together, that is they are not normally the kind of person who would play this game, but in this context they might as well participate and would then find it to be fun for example).

3.3.2 Engaging in play as long as a sense of positive cultural value persists

Once a player has reached the point of accepting an offering as suitable or agreeable (that they are likely to be the kind of person who would play such a game or with such a device), they will then be disposed to play it. This engagement as a state of disposition is not fixed, in that it is not such that a player who is engaged by the idea of playing will automatically then set about playing the game ‘fully’ (as the designer intended); rather it is such that the negotiations between the player’s sense of identification, the imagined reactions of their social context, and the actual experience of playing the game are fully initiated. Initially there is a sense of traversal from wanting to play the game to ‘actually’ or ‘really’ playing. This phase might be seen as ‘giving the game a chance’ and lacks a clear end unless the match between expectations and the actual experience of play shows that the game dramatically disappoints the player, at which point the value sum will be negative and the individual will stop being engaged and thus stop playing. We could say that for every new element that is introduced throughout the playing of a game the player will be ‘giving it a chance’, but this is increasingly subtle with the player also having extra investments in play (having spent the time to gain skill, develop characters, engage with the narrative or similar).

Once a player has selected an offering and then encountered that offering without being ‘put off’ by a negative sum of identification, they may be said to have recognized it as a game that they would be disposed to playing. However many games are not a simple interaction repeated over and over again but often progressively introduce new elements to the player as the player gains skill, tokens, or progresses through the story or different challenges and levels. As such for many games the player will be constantly evaluating the offering as they go; shifting their sense of value in light of new elements. Even though the terrain of the game is shifting, the player must always feel that they are engaged in an activity of positive net worth or they will stop playing or will not return to play in future sessions.

It is likely that as players move from the negotiated factors of selection to factors associated with play there is a shift of emphasis away from surface factors (thematic, graphics and such) toward ludic factors (game mechanic, challenge and such). That is players might find that they feel that they are the kind of person who would play a game with a particular graphical style say, and as they play the game become less concerned with the particular graphical style and more concerned with the actualities of playing the game; meeting the challenges or progressing through the story for example. This is the position of Aarseth (2004) who argues that the nature of any avatar is likely to fade into the background as a player focuses on ludic aspects of the game as they play. Likewise Juul’s (2010) assertion that the ‘fiction’ of a game is the first factor encountered and engaged with before other elements are considered is not completely rejected.

The degree to which they have already formed an identification will influence a player’s degree of perseverance, such that offerings with which the player has formed a strong personal connection (by developing characters or other ‘actors’ and objects, engaging with a story, or developing skill) will be much more resilient to problems such as a particularly difficult challenge, a bug, a displeasing plot direction, or any other unexpected negative experience. That is players can become more or less the kind of person who would play such a game as they acquire or lose any sense of personal connection. Similarly as a player invests resources to make progress in a game they become less likely to disengage until the player feels that this investment has resulted in a payoff, few people like to feel that they are ‘quitters’, however players do not like to feel that they are being forced to repeat gameplay elements they have already mastered or understood. This sense of progress and growth toward an arbitrary goal (a higher score, a new level, the next part of the story) can be related to an interpretation of Flow theory that suggests that ‘skill matching’ does not create engagement without the individual feeling that progress is being made toward a personally meaningful end (Csikszentmihalyi 1990).

Another type of development which is particularly true of multiplayer games is that of a social nature. Especially where online play might be concerned, the amount of socialization for some types of games (i.e. Massively Multiplayer Online games or MMOs) acts as a means of reinforcing some users’ engagements or a means of driving down engagement for others. To some players the appeal of having a set of trusted and decent playmates is apparent where the facility to play against others online is available. However, some are likely to find that they are not the kind of person who wants to micromanage other people in terms of competition schedules and training sessions, or that they are not the kind of person who wants to spend a large amount of time engaged in activities to support the play activity they identify with, and will become less engaged as the amount of required social interaction increases.

Another factor which might influence a player’s sense of engagement is a shift in context. External factors might have the player become less likely to feel that they are the kind of person who would engage in a game as other life pressures impinge on the experience. Take for example a player who is engaged by the degree to which the game facilitates social play; if the social context changes, for example by play mates ceasing to play, then the game will become less engaging as this feature or factor is less well supported.

3.3.3 Reinforcing the degree of sense of value by reflection

It is apparent that past experiences are fed back into future selections. This feedback does not seem to loop directly from putting one game aside to openly selecting the next, rather there appears to be an ongoing period of reflection, which seems to summarize the pros and cons of past experiences resulting in more carefully considered future selections.

It seems there are two types of reflection, implicit reflection and explicitly expressed reflection. That is there are times when an individual appears to be forming an opinion that can only be based on their past experiences without necessarily consciously analyzing their experience, and there are times when individuals’ experiences with various offerings can be heard being openly discussed respectively. The act of tacit reflection is difficult to demonstrate other than in the player, when quizzed, relating their preference (or dislike) of new propositions to past experiences, but struggling to put their finger on why they have this value position other than in relation to those same past experiences. It is when a user tries to relate the qualities of an offering to others that the reflective player must make value judgements as to what factors to highlight and espouse or reject. A number of observations could be made about the nature of reflection, but suffice it to say that much of the data used in this programme of research was based on interviews where the interviewer implied that the interviewee should explicitly reflect on their past gaming experiences and engagements. While this might seem introspective and thus a collection of possibly poorly realized subjective reports on interviewees’ tacit knowledge, hopefully the methodology employed has heterophenomenologically arrived at an account with some utility.

The less formal interviews in the data (along with some field notes on casual observations made) reveal that in discussing which experiences individuals found engaging, there is a degree of rhetoric involved. Individuals expounding the merits of the experiences they engage with and those that they do not; occasionally attempting to convince the other of the merits or faults of games they have played, which serves to amplify the sense of identification and hence degree of engagement.

Comment 15

I am not familiar with the domain of videogaming. However, I found the above expose most informative and indeed riveting. Although I still remain unclear as to the status of the theory being proposed, I am very clear as to the information value of the exposition. I wonder, then, if the value of the research output is simply that of informing others. For example, if I taught videogaming as part of an HCI course or was tasked with the introduction of videogaming to designers from another domain, I would make it obligatory reading. It is full of ideas and insights and these could be informally carried forward into other types of process, for example design, game theorising etc. The notion of ‘sensitisation’ comes to mind along with ‘treatise’ and ‘essay’ as possible forms of expression. I leave them for the reader’s consideration.

End Comment 15

4. conclusions

Hopefully, the summary of the theory provided above gives the reader enough information to be able to decide if these hypotheses make sense, and if the main hypothesis of a cyclical process of seeking cultural value fits the explored domain. Obviously the methodology employed focuses on certain aspects of a player’s experience. So no sense of a player’s emotion is considered explicitly, for example. Many apparent omissions are likely due to them being expected in the data due to a priori positions, as for example little mention was made by subjects of their preferred emotional states, other than a game should be fun or interesting and not boring.

A small (9 respondent) survey of interested parties asked to review a very brief summary of the results reveals that the degree of fit and relevance is good with two caveats. These caveats are that the short presentation of the theory only seemed to account for extensive cycles of engagement and not one off experiences which might still be deemed engaging, and that the result is an obvious truism. Hopefully this more extensive presentation of the theory helps to demonstrate that to some extent the one-off interaction is included as an extreme case (where the individual is the kind of person who would play that game in that context, but not necessarily in others), while the charge that the theory is an obvious truism is not supported by the empirical literature, as there seems to be very little which deals with concepts of a process of finding engagement in videogames by a constantly evaluated or negotiated sense of cultural value. So if this theory is a truism it seems to have little impact on much empirical research into player experiences, maybe because it has not been stated clearly.

5. discussion

A pertinent observation about player engagement is made by Carr (2005). In attempting to account for an observation that girls in a specifically convened female only gaming club Carr notes that “Different people will accumulate particular gaming skills, knowledge and frames of reference, according to the patterns of access and peer culture they encounter – and these accumulations will pool as predispositions, and manifest as preferences.” while “Preferences are an assemblage, made up of past access and positive experiences, and subject to situation and context.”, which seems to be quite closely related to the theory presented here. This observation is substantively different from say those of Malone (1981) and subsequent multi factor theories as it does not state that players engage with Challenge, Curiosity and Fantasy (or some other factors such as novelty and spectacle; excitement of combat; game characters; persistence; exploration; advancement; unraveling of puzzles; building, creating and controlling; humour; relation to one’s hobby or interest; audiovisual quality; imaginary world; and winning (Ermi and Mäyrä 2003)), but gives us some indication of what process a player goes through in arriving at the specific combination of factors that engages them.

In terms of related work from other domains McCarthy and Wright (2004) have taken a theoretically driven approach which has arrived at similar conclusions drawing for Pragmatic theory. That is the research presented in this paper was empirical abductive research, where as McCarthy and Wright seem to have used a theoretical deductive approach, but we have arrived at a position which neatly fits into a Pragmatic position. Where the theory in this paper relates the engagement with videogames to Cooley’s ‘Looking glass self’ and notes that engagements are cyclical and sit within a social context McCarthy and Wright take theories from Dewey (1934) and Bakhtin (1993) to arrive at related conclusions about the felt experience of the use of technology in general. One point of similarity is that they also recognise that an engagement is not simply a single (or repeated) instance of use, but also contains expectation and reflection, placing the experiencing subject and the object of experience in the broadest context. The breadth of this context extending out into personal conception of personal meaning and cultural value of the individual’s life, not just their life related to the technological artifact. This consideration of the overall felt experience (history, reflection, context) of the individual then determines the degree of meaning and value they then apply to the experience they are having as they have it.

So is a theory that players must be able to find the value in playing as a kind of investment of cultural negatives in order to make net cultural gains useful?

As a means of reframing the problem of Game Design to consider the broad cultural context of different player perspectives, some surveyed games professionals have shown an interest. However it seems apparent that some sectors of the industry are well aware that users must identify themselves as potential players and are already extending their thinking to traditionally under exploited kinds of players (e.g. Nintendo’s successes with products that purport to promote mental and physical fitness, and play in a social context). Certainly recent attempts at marketing games seem to focus on the player as much as the game, in a seeming attempt to demonstrate to the user what kinds of people would be players of the games and devices being released.

As a means of framing understanding of what engages players, it could be suggested that the core hypothesis is too broad; so inclusive as to describe all human experience of entertainment products at a macro level, with little to say about individual cases of subjective engagement. However the supporting hypotheses and how they interrelate could be said to provide a meso level description of engagement which hopefully helps us understand individual cases more clearly.

It is obvious that more work is required. The summary presented in this paper is necessarily quite brief. It is immediately apparent that each contributing factor or hypothesis could be explained in much more detail, with reference to the data from which it was derived. An effort will be made to disseminate these detailed descriptions at a later date. Similarly while an attempt was made to saturate a small number of critical hypotheses, other hypotheses which might be of significant interest to the fields of design and research are relatively under saturated; as such further research to flesh out these ideas will be needed. An attempt to translate these theoretical findings into some practical artifacts would both help to validate the theory to some extent and to provide further operational information for design practitioners.

6. REFERENCES

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BAKHTIN, M. 1993. Toward a Philosophy of the Act. 1st ed. Austin: University of Texas Press.

BROWN, EMILY, AND PAUL CAIRNS. 2004. ‘A Grounded Investigation of Game Immersion’. In CHI ’04 Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 1297–1300. Vienna, Austria: ACM.

BRYANT, ANTONY. 2007. The SAGE Handbook of Grounded Theory. Los Angeles ;;London: SAGE.

CARR, D. 2005. ‘Contexts, Gaming Pleasures, and Gendered Preferences’. Simulation & Gaming 36 (4) (December): 464–482. doi:10.1177/1046878105282160.

COOLEY, CHARLES. 1902. Human Nature and the Social Order. New Brunswick (U.S.A.): Transaction Books.

COWLEY, BEN, DARRYL CHARLES, MICHAELA BLACK, AND RAY HICKEY. 2008. ‘Toward an Understanding of Flow in Video Games’. Comput. Entertain. 6 (2): 1–27.

CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, MIHALY. 1990. Flow : the Psychology of Optimal Experience. 1st ed. New York: Harper & Row.

DEWEY, JOHN. 1934. Art as Experience. Perigee Trade pbk. ed. New York: Perigee Books.

ERMI, LAURA, AND FRANS MÄYRÄ. 2003. ‘Power and Control of Games: Children as the Actors of Game Cultures’. In Level Up: Digital Games Research Conference, 234–244. Utrecht.

FABRICATORE, CARLO, MIGUEL NUSSBAUM, AND RICARDO ROSAS. 2002. ‘Playability in Action Videogames: A Qualitative Design Model’. Human-Computer Interaction 17 (4) (December): 311–368. doi:10.1207/S15327051HCI1704_1.

GLASER, BARNEY. 1978. Theoretical Sensitivity: Advances in the Methodology of Grounded Theory. Sociology Press, Mill Valley, CA.

———. 1992. Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis. [S.l.]: Sociology Press.

GLASER, BARNEY, AND ANSELM STRAUSS. 1967. Discovery of Grounded Theory. Sociology Press, Mill Valley, CA.

JUUL, JESPER. 2010. A Casual Revolution : Reinventing Video Games and Their Players. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

MALONE, THOMAS. 1981. ‘Toward a Theory of Intrinsically Motivating Instruction’. Cognitive Science 5 (4) (October): 333–369. doi:10.1207/s15516709cog0504_2.

MCCARTHY, JOHN, AND PETER C. WRIGHT. 2004. Technology as Experience. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.

SWEETSER, PENELOPE, AND DANIEL JOHNSON. 2004. ‘Player-Centered Game Environments: Assessing Player Opinions, Experiences, and Issues’. In Third International Conference, Proceedings. Eindhoven: Springer Berlin / Heidelberg.

I often wonder, like many other researchers, if papers, published much earlier in time, have anything to say to present researchers, given the radical changes in information technology, which have occurred in the meantime. One would like to think so. However, it is most likely that some serious updating of those papers would be required for that to be so.

Here is a case in question. The paper ‘Interacting with the Computer: a Framework’ by Morton, Barnard, Hammond and Long was published in 1979 – more than 35 years ago. It was one of the fist of its kind and was very ambitious. It attempted to combine the science of Psychology with the applied science of information technology design.

I contend that the paper indeed has something to say to present-day researchers and practitioners; but that considerable updating and extension would be in order. I make some suggestions in the form of comments, as to what these might be. The comments are generally based on the Discipline Framework of Long and Dowell ( 1989) and the Design Problem Framework of Dowell and Long (1989).

Introduction to the Paper and the Comments

At one of their ongoing social/professional lunches, JM, PB, and JL modestly agreed that this paper was one of the best ever produced by their MRC HCI Group (and indeed by any other group researching HCI at the time). They also wondered, even more modestly, if it might still have something to say to the HCI researchers and practitioners of to-day, more than 35 years after its original publication. In a fast-moving area like HCI, that would be something.

These comments, by John Long, do not attempt to answer this question. That is for the Group. However, they do raise issues that, in his opinion, would have to be addressed were the paper to be re-published, either as a paper (or indeed used, as originally intended, as the structure for a book). As claimed in the paper: ‘Recent technology in 1979 centred around the personal, as opposed to the main-frame computer’. Now, however, technological advances include many additional types of computing: mobile; intelligent; social; ambient; smart; ubiquitous; ludic; co-operative; networked; wearable; affective etc etc. The Framework would need to accommodate such changes in some way to engage current HCI workers. In addition, the Framework would need to address issues to-day, which it itself raised in 1979.

My comments are offered here, of course, in all modesty. They are intended to clear the ground, as a preliminary to answering the question as to what the paper might have to offer the HCI researchers and practitioners of to-day.

Interacting with the Computer: a Framework

John Long Comment 1

The title remains an appropriate one. However, given its subsequent references to: ‘domains’; ‘applications’; ‘application domains’; ‘tasks’ etc, it must be assumed that the interaction is: ‘to do something’; ‘to perform tasks’; ‘to achieve aims or goals’; or some such. Further modeling of such domains/applications, beyond that of text processing, would be required for any re-publication of the paper and in the light of advances in computing technology – see earlier. The issue is pervasive – see also Comments 6, 35, 37, 40 and 41.

End Comment 1

Comment 2

‘A Framework’ is also considered to be appropriate. Better than ‘a conception’, which promises greater completeness, coherence and fitness-for-purpose (unless, of course, these criteria are explicitly taken on-board). However, the Framework must explicitly declare and own its purpose, as later set out in the paper and referenced in Figure 1. See also Comments 15, 19, 27, and 42.

End Comment 2

J. Morton, P. Barnard, N. Hammond* and J.B. Long

M.R.C. Applied Psychology Unit, Cambridge, England *also IBM Scientific Centre, Peterlee, England

Recent technological advances in the development of information processing systems will inevitably lead to a change in the nature of human-computer interaction.

Comment 3

‘Recent technological advances’ in 1979 centred around the personal, as opposed to the main-frame, computer. To-day there are a plethora of advances in computing technology – see Commentary Introduction earlier for a list of examples. A re-publication of the paper would require a major up-date to address these new applications, as well as their associated users. Any up-date would need to include additional models and tools for such address, as well as an assessment of the continued suitability of the models and tools, proposed in the ’79 paper.

End Comment 3

Direct interactions with systems will no longer be the sole province of the sophisticated data processing professional or the skilled terminal user. In consequence, assumptions underlying human-system communication will have to be re-evaluated for a broad range of applications and users. The central issue of the present paper concerns the way in which this re-evaluation should occur.

First of all, then, we will present a characterisation of the effective model which the computer industry has of the interactive process.

Comment 4

We contrasted our ’79 models/theories with a single computer industry’s model. To-day, there are many types of HCI model/theory. A recent book on the subject listed 9 types of ‘Modern Theories’ and 6 types of ‘Contemporary Theories’ (Rogers, 2012). The ‘industry model’ has, of course, itself evolved and now takes many forms (Harper et al., 2008). Any re-publication of the ’79 paper would have to specify both with which HCI models/theories it wished to be contrasted and with what current industry models.

End Comment 4

The shortcoming of the model is that it fails to take proper account of the nature of the user and as such can not integrate, interpret, anticipate or palliate the kinds of errors which the new user will resent making. For remember that the new user will avoid error by adopting other means of gaining his ends, which can lead either to non-use or to monstrously inefficient use. We will document some user problems in support of this contention and indicate the kinds of alternative models which we are developing in an attempt to meet this need.

The Industry’s Model (IM)

The problem we see with the industry’s model of the human-computer interaction is that it is computer-centric. In some cases, as we shall see, it will have designer-centric aspects as well.

Comment 5

In 1979, all design was carried out by software engineers. Since then, many other professionals have become involved – initially psychologists, then HCI-trained practitioners, graphic designers, ethnomethodologists, technocratic artists etc. However, most design (as opposed to user requirements gathering or evaluation) is still performed by software engineers. Any re-publication of this paper would have to identify the different sorts of design activity, to assess their relative contribution to computer- and designer-centricity respectively and the form of support appropriate to each, which it might offer – see also Comments 14, 15, 21 (iv) and (v), 27 and 41 (iv).

End Comment 5

To start off with, consider a system designed to operate in a particular domain of activity.

Comment 6

Any re-published paper would have to develop more further the concept of ‘domain’ (see Comment 1). The development would need to address: 1. The computer’s version of the domain and its display thereof. There is no necessary one-to-one relationship (consider the pilot alarm systems in the domain of air traffic management). Software engineer designers might specify the former and HCI designers the latter; and 2. To what extent the domain is an ‘image of the world and its resources’. See Comments 1, 35, 37, 40 and 41.

End Comment 6

In the archetypal I.M. the database is neutralised in much the same kind of way that a statistician will ritually neutralise the data on which he operates, stripping his manipulation of any meaning other than the purely numerical one his equations impose upon the underlying reality. This arises because the only version of the domain which exists at the interface is that one which is expressed in the computer. This version, perhaps created by an expert systems analyst on the best logical grounds and the most efficient, perhaps, for the computations which have to be performed, becomes the one to which the user must conform. This singular and logical version of the domain will, at best, be neutral from the point of view of the user. More often it will be an alien creature, isolating the user and mocking him with its image of the world and its resources to which he must haplessly conform.

Florid language? But listen to the user talking.

Comment 7

The ’79 user data are now quite out of date, both in terms of their content, means of acquisition and associated technology, compared with more recent data. However, current user-experience continues to have much in common with that of the past. Up-dated data are required to confirm this continuity.

End Comment 7

“We come into contact with computer people, a great many of whom talk a very alien language, and you have constant difficulty in trying to sort out this kind of mid-Atlantic jargon.”

“We were slung towards what in my opinion is a pretty inadequate manual and told to get on with it”

“We found we were getting messages back through the terminal saying there’s not sufficient space on the machine. Now how in Hell’s name are we supposed to know whether there’s sufficient space on the machine?” .

In addition the industry’s model does not really include the learning process; nor does it always take adequate note of individual’s abilities and experience:

“Documentation alone is not sufficient; there needs to be the personal touch as well . ”

“Social work being much more of an art than a science then we are talking about people who are basically not very numerate beginning to use a machine which seems to be essentially numerate.”

Even if training is included in the final package it is never in the design model. Is there anyone here, who, faced with a design choice asked the questions “Which option will be the easiest to describe to the naive user? Which option will be easiest to understand? Which option will be easiest to learn and remember?”

Comment 8

Naive users, of course, continue to exist to-day. However, there are many more types of users than naive and professional of interest to current HCI researchers. Differences exist between users of associated technologies (robotic versus ambient); from different demographics (old versus young); at different stages of development (nursery versus teenage children); from different cultures (developed versus less developed) etc. These different types of user would need some consideration in any re-publication.

End Comment 8

Let us note again the discrepancy between the I.M. view of error and ours . For us errors are an indication of something wrong with the system or an indication of the way in which training should proceed. In the I.M. errors are an integral part of the interaction. For the onlooker the most impressive part of a D.P. interaction is not that it is error free but that the error recovery procedures are so well practised that it is difficult to recognise them for what they are .

Comment 9

As well as this important distinction, concerning errors, they need to be related to ‘domains’, applications’ and ‘effectiveness’ or ‘performance’ and not just user (or indeed computer) behaviour. See Comment 6 earlier and Comments 35, 36, 37 and 38 later.

Errorless performance may not be acceptable (consider air traffic expedition). Errorful behaviour may be acceptable (consider some e-mail errors). A re-published ’79 paper would have to take an analytic/technical(that is Framework grounded) view of error and not just a simple adoption of users’ (lay-language) expression. This problem is ubiquitous in HCI, both past and present.

End Comment 9

We would not want it thought that we felt the industry was totally arbitrary . There are a number of natural guiding principles which most designers would adhere to. See also Comment 16.

Comment 10

We contrast here two types of principle, which designers might adhere to: 1. IM principles, as ‘intuitive, non-systematic, not totally arbitrary’; and our proposed principles, as ‘systematic’. In the light of this contrast, we need to set out clearly: 1. What and how are our principles ‘systematic’? and 2. How does this systematicity guarantee/support better design?

Note that in Figure 1 later, there is an ‘output to system designers’. Is this output expressed in (systematic) principles? If not, what would be its form of expression? Any form of expression would raise the same issues raised earlier for ‘sysematic principles’.

End Comment 10

We do not anticipate meeting a system in which the command DESTROY has the effect of preserving the information currently displayed while PRESERVE had the effect of erasing the operating system. However , the principles employed are intuitive and non-systematic. Above all they make the error of embodying the belief that just as there can only be one appropriate representation of the domain, so there is only one kind of human mind.

A nice example of a partial use of language constraints is provided by a statistical package called GENSTAT. This package permits users to have permanent userfiles and also temporary storage in a workfile. The set of commands associated with these facilities are :

PUT – copies from core to workfile

GET – copies from workfile to core

FILE – defines a userfile

SAVE – copies from workfile to userfile

FETCH – copies from userfile to workfile

The commands certainly have the merit that they have the expected directionality with respect to the user. However to what extent do, for example, FETCH and GET relate naturally to the functions they have been assigned? No doubt the designers have strong intuitions about these assignments. So do users and they do not concur. We asked 40 people here at the A. P.U. which way round they thought the assignments should go: nineteen of these agreed with the system designers, 21 went the 0ther way . The confidence levels of rationalisations were very convincing on both sides!

The problem then, is not just that systems tend to be designer-centric but that the designers have the wrong model either of the learning process or of the non-D.P. users’ attitude toward error. A part-time user is going to be susceptible to memory failure and, in particular, to interference from outside the computer system. du Boulay and O’ Shea [I] note that naive users can use THEN in the sense of ‘next’ rather then as ‘implies’. This is inconceivable to the IM for THEN is almost certainly a full homonym for most D.P. and the appropriate meaning the appropriate meaning thoroughly context-determined .

Comment 11

The GENSTAT example was so good for our purposes, that it has taken considerable reflection to wonder if there really is a natural language solution, which would avoid memory failure and/or interference. It is certainly not obvious.

The alternative would be to add information to a menu or somesuch (rather like in our example). But this is just the sort of solution IM software engineers might propose. Where would that leave any ‘systematic’ principles’? – see Comment 10 earlier.

End Comment 11

An Alternative to the Industry Model

The central assumption for the system of the future will be ‘systems match people’ rather than ‘people match systems’. Not entirely so, as we shall elaborate, for in principle, the capacity and perspectives of the user with respect to a task domain could well change through interaction with a computer system.

Comment 12

In general, the alternative aims to those of the IM promise well. The mismatch, however, seems to be expressed at a more abstract level than that of the ‘task domain’ – the ‘alien creature, isolating the user and mocking him with its image of the world and its resources to which he must haplessly conform’ – see earlier in the paper. Suppose the mismatch is at this specific level, where does this leave, for example, the natural language mismatch? Of course, we could characterise domain-specific mismatches, for example, the contrasting references to ambient environment in air- and sea-traffic management, although for professional, not for naive users. Such mismatches would require a form of domain model absent from the original paper. However, the same issue arises in the domains of letter writing and planning by means of ‘to do’ lists. Either way, the application domain mismatch needs to be addressed, along with that of natural language.

End Comment 12

But the capacity to change is more limited than the variety available in the system .

Comment 13

The contrast ‘personal versus mainframe computer’ and the parallel contrast ‘occasional/naive versus professional user’ served us very well in ’79. But the explosion of new computing technology (see Comment 3 earlier) and associated users requires a more refined set of contrasts. There are, of course, still occasional naive users; but these are mainly in the older population and constitute a modest percentage of current users. However, with demographic changes and a longer-living older population, it would not be an uninteresting sub-set of all present users. A re-publication, which wanted to restrict its range in the manner of the ’79 paper, might address ‘older users’ and domestic/personal computing technology. An interesting associated domain might be ‘computer-supported co-operative social and health care’. We could be our own ‘subjects, targets, researchers, and designers’, as per Figure 1 later.

End Comment 13

Our task, then, is to characterise the mismatch between man and computer in such a way that permits us to direct the designer’s effort.

Comment 14

Directing the designer’s efforts are strong words and need to be linked to the notion and guarantee of principles – see Comment 10 and Figure 1 ‘output to designers’. Such direction of design needs to be aligned with scientific/applied scientific or engineering aims (see Comments 15 and 18).

End Comment 14

In doing this we are developing two kinds of tool, conceptual and empirical. These interrelate within an overall scheme for researching human-computer interaction as shown in Figure 1.

Comment 15

Figure 1 raises many issues:

1. Empirical studies require their own form of conceptualisation, for example: ‘problems’; ‘variables’; ‘tasks’ etc. These concepts would need specification before they could be conceptualised in the form of multiple models and operationalised for system designers.

2. What is the relationship between ‘hypothesis’ and the thories/knowledge of Psychology? Would the latter inform the former? If so, how exactly? This remains an endemic problem for applied science (see Kuhn, 1970).

3. Are ‘models’, as represented here, in some (or any) sense Psychological theories or knowledge? The point needs to be clarified – see also Comment 15 (1) earlier.

4. What might be the ‘output to system designers’ – guidelines; principles; systematic heuristics; hints and tips; novel design solutions; methods; education/training etc? See also Comment 14.

5. How is the ‘output to system designers’ to be validated? There is no arrow back to either ‘models’ or ‘working hypotheses’. At the very least, validation requires: conceptualisation; operationalisation; test; and generalisation. But with respect to what – hypotheses for understanding phenomena or with respect to designing artefacts?

End Comment 15

Relating Conceptual and Empirical Tools

Comment 16

The relationship between conceptual and analytic tools and their illustration reads like engineering. In ’79, I thought that we were doing ‘applied science’ (following in the footsteps of Donald Broadbent, the MRC/APU’s director in 1979). The distinction between engineering and applied science needs clarification in any republished version of the original paper.

Interestingly enough, Card, Moran and Newell (1983) claimed to be doing ‘engineering’. Their primary models were the Human Information Processing (HIP) Model and the Goals, Operators, Methods and Strategies (GOMS) Model. There is some interesting overlap with some of our multiple models; but also important differences. One option for a republished paper would be to keep to the ’79 multiple models. An alternative option would to augment the HIP and GOMS with the ’79 multiple models (or vice versa), to offer a (more) complete expression of either approach taken separately.

End Comment 16

The conceptual tools involve the development of a set of analytic frameworks appropriate to human computer interaction. The empirical tools involve the development of valid test procedures both for the introduction of new systems and the proving of the analytic tools. The two kinds of tool are viewed as fulfilling functions comparable to the role of analytic and empirical tools in the development of technology. They may be compared with the analytic role of physics, metallurgy and aerodynamics in the development of aircraft on the one hand and the empirical role of a wind tunnel in simulating flight on the other hand.

Empirical Tools

The first class of empirical tool we have employed is the observational field study, with which we aim to identify some of the variables underlying both the occasional user’s perceptions of the problems he encounters in the use of a computer system, and the behaviour of the user at the terminal itself.

Comment 17

Observational field studies have undergone considerable development since ’79. Many have become ethnomethodological studies, to understand the context of use, others have become front-ends to user-centred design methodologies, intended to be conducted in parallel to those of software engineering. Neither sort of development is addressed by our original paper. Both raise numerous issues, including: the mutation of lay-language into technical language; the relationship between user opinions/attitudes and behaviour; the relationship between the simulation of domains of application and experimental studies; the integration of multiple variables into design; etc.

End Comment 17

The opinions cited above were obtained in a study of occasional users discussing the introduction and use of a system in a local government centre [2]. The discussions were collected using a technique which is particularly free from observer influence [3 ].

In a second field study we obtained performance protocols by monitoring users while they solved a predefined set of problems using a data base manipulation language [4 ]. We recorded both terminal performance and a running commentary which we asked the user to make, and wedded these to the state of the machine to give a total picture of the interaction. The protocols have proved to be a rich source of classes of user problem from which hypotheses concerning the causes of particular types of mismatch can be generated.

Comment 18

HCI has never given the concept of ‘classes of user problem’ the attention that it deserves. Clearly, HCI has a need for generality (see Comment 10, concerning (systematic) principles with their implications of generalisation). Of course, generalising over user problems is critical; but so more comprehensively is generalising over ‘design problems’. The latter might express the ineffectiveness of users interacting with computers to perform tasks (or somesuch). The original paper does not really say much about generalisation – its conceptualisation; operationalisation; test; and – taken together – validation. Any republication would have to rise to this challenge.

End Comment 18

Comment 19

The concept of ’cause’ here is redolent of science, for example, as in Psychology. See also Comment 18, as concerns phenomena and Comment 15 for a contrast with engineering. Science and engineering are very different disciplines. Any re-publication would have to address this difference and to locate the multiple models and their application with respect to it.

End Comment 19

There is thus a close interplay between these field studies, the generation of working hypotheses and the development of the conceptual frameworks. We give some extracts from this study in a later section.

Comment 20

This claim would hold for both a scientific (or applied scientific) and an engineering endeavour. See also Comments 15 and 18 earlier. However, both would be required to align themselves with Figures 1 and 2 of the original paper.

End Comment 20

A third type of empirical tool is used to test specific predictions of the working hypothesis.

Comment 21

The testing of predictions (which in conjunction with the explanation of phenomena, together constituting understanding) suggests the notion of science (see Comments 18 and 19), which can be contrasted with the prescription of design solutions (which in conjunction with the diagnosis of design problems, together constituting design of artefacts), as engineering (see Comment 15). The difference concerning the purpose of multiple models needs clarification.

End Comment 21

The tool is a multi-level interactive system which enables the experimenter to simulate a variety of user interfaces, and is capable of modeling and testing a wide range of variables [5]. It is based on a code-breaking task in which users perform a variety of string-manipulation and editing functions on coded messages.

It allows the systematic evaluation of notational, semantic and syntactic variables. Among the results to be extensively reported elsewhere is that if there is a common argument in a set of commands, each of which takes two arguments, then the common argument must come first for greatest ease of use. Consistency of argument order is not enough: when the common argument consistently comes second no advantage is obtained relative to inconsistent ordering of arguments [6].

Comment 22

The 2-argument example is persuasive on the face of it; but is it a ‘principle’ (see Comment 10) and might it appear in the ‘output to designers’ (Figure 1 and Comment 15(4))? If so, how is its domain independence established? This point raises again the issue of generalisation – see also Comment 17.

End Comment 22

Conceptual Tools

Since we conceive the problem as a cognitive one, the tools are from the cognitive sciences.

Comment 23

The claim is in no way controversial. However, it raises the question of whether the interplay between these cognitive tools and the working hypotheses (see Figure 1) also contribute to Cognitive Science (that is, Psychology)? See also Comment 15(3). Such a contribution would be in addition to the ‘output to designers’ of Figure 1.

End Comment 23

Also we define the problem as one with those users who would be considered intellectually and motivationally qualified by any normal standards. Thus we do not admit as a potential solution that of finding “better” personnel, or simply paying them more, even if such a solution were practicable.

Comment 24

If ‘design problem’ replaced ‘user problem’ (see also Comment 18), then better personnel and/or better pay might indeed contribute to the design (solution) of the design problem. The two types of problem, that is, design problem and user problem need to be related and grounded in the Framework. The latter, for example, might be conceptualised as a sub-set of the former. Eitherway, additional conceptualisation of the Framework is required. See also Comment 18.

End Comment 24

The cognitive incompatibility we describe is qualitative not quantitative and the mismatch we are looking for is one between the user’s concept of the system structure and the real structure: between the way the data base is organised in the machine and the way it is organised in the head of the user: the way in which system details are usually encountered by the user and his preferred mode of learning.

The interaction of human and computer in a problem-solving environment is a complex matter and we cannot find sufficient theory in the psychological literature to support our intuitive needs. He have found it necessary to produce our own theories, drawing mainly on the spirit rather than the substance of established work.

Comment 25

It sounds like our ‘own’ theories are indeed psychological theories (or would be if constructed). See also Comments 21 and 23.

End Comment 25

Further than this, it is apparent that the problem is too complex for us to be able to use a single theoretical representation.

Comment 26

Decomposition (as in multiple models) is a well-tried and trusted solution to complexity. However, re-integration will be necessary at some stage and for some purpose. Understanding (Psychology) and design of artefacts (HCI) would be two such (different) purposes. They need to be distinguished. See also Comment 15(5).

End Comment 26

The model should not only be appropriate for design, it should also give a means of characterising errors – so as to understand their origins and enable corrective measures to be taken.

Comment 27

What characterises a ‘model appropriate for design’? (see also Comment 15(4) and(5)). Design would have to be conceptualised for this purpose. Features might be derived from field studies of designer practice (see Figure 1); but a conceptualisation would not be ‘given’; but would have to be constructed (in the manner of the models). This construction would be a non-trivial undertaking. But how else could models be assured to be fit-for-(design)purpose? See also Comment 14).

End Comment 27

Take the following protocol.

The user is asked to find the average age of entries in the block called PEOPLE.

“I’ll have a go and see what happens” types: *T <-AVG(AGE,PEOPlE)

machine response: AGE – UNSET BLOCK

“Yes, wrong, we have an unset block. So it’s reading AGE as a block, so if we try AGE and PEOPLE the other way round maybe that’ll work.”

This is very easy to diagnose and correct. The natural language way of talking about the target of the operation is mapped straight into the argument order. The cure would be to reverse the argument order for the function AVG to make it compatible.

Comment 28

Natural language here is used both to diagnose ‘user problems’ and to propose solutions to those problems. Natural language, however, does not appear in the paper as a model, as such. Its extensive nature in psychology/linguistics would prohibit such inclusion. Further, there are many theories of natural language and no agreement as to their state of validation (or rejection). However, the model appears as a block in the BIM (see Figure 2). The model/representation, of course, might be intuitive, in the form and practice of lay-language, which we all possess. However, such intuitions would also be available to software engineers and would not distinguish systematic from non-systematic principles ( see Comment 10). The issue would need to be addressed in any re-publication of the ’79 paper.

End Comment 28

The next protocol is more obscure. The task is the same as in the preceding one.

“We can ask it (the computer) to bring to the terminal the average value of this attribute.”

types: *T -AVG( AGE)

machine response: AVG(AGE) – ILLEGAL NAME

“Ar.d it’s still illegal. .. ( … ) I’ve got to specify the block as well as the attribute name.”

Well of course you have to specify the block. How else is the machine going to know what you’re talking about? A very natural I.M. response. How can we be responsible for feeble memories like this.

However, a more careful diagnosis reveals that the block PEOPLE is the topic of the ‘conversation’ in any case.

Comment 29

Is ‘topic of conversation’, as used here an intuition, derived from lay-language or a sub-set of some natural language theory, derived form Psychology/Linguistics? This is a good example of the issue raised by Comment 28. The same question could be asked of the use of ‘natural language conventions’, which follows next.

End Comment 29

The block has just been used and the natural language conventions are quite clear on the point.

We have similar evidence for the importance of human-machine discourse structures from the experiment using the code-breaking task described above. Command strings seem to be more ‘cognitively compatible’ when the subject of discourse (the common argument) is placed before the variable argument. This is perhaps analogous to the predisposition in sentence expression for stating information which is known or assumed before information which is new [7]. We are currently investigating this influence of natural language on command string compatibility in more detail.

Comment 30

These natural language interpretations and the associated argumentation remain both attractive and plausible. However, command languages in general (with the exception of programmers) have fallen out of favour. Given the concept of the domain of application/tasks and the requirements of the Goal Structure Model, some addition to the natural language model would likely be required for any re-publication of the ’79 paper. Some relevance-related, plan-based speech act theory might commend itself in this case.

End Comment 30

The Block Interaction Model

Comment 31

The BIM remains a very interesting and challenging model and was (and remains) ahead of its time. For example, the very inclusion of the concept of domain (as a hospital; jobs in an employment agency etc); but, in addition, the associated representations of the user, the computer and the workbase. Thirty-four years later, HCI researchers are still ‘trying to pick the bits/blocks out of that’ in complex domains such as air traffic and emergency services management. Further development of the BIM in the form of more completely modeled exemplars would be required by any republished paper.

End Comment 31

Systematic evidence from empirical studies, together with experience of our own, has led us to develop a conceptual analysis of the information in the head of the user (see figure 2). Our aim with one form of analysis is to identify as many separable kinds of knowledge as possible and chart their actual or potential interactions with one another. Our convention here is to use a block diagram with arrows indicating potential forms of interference. This diagram enables us to classify and thus group examples of interference so that they could be counteracted in a coordinated fashion rather than piecemeal. It also enables us to establish a framework within which to recognise the origin of problems which we haven’t seen before. Figure 2 is a simplified form of this model. The blocks with double boundaries, connected by double lines, indicate the blocks of information used by the ideal user. The other lines indicate prime classes of interference. The terminology we have used is fairly straightforward: Domain – the range of the specific application of a system. This could be a hospital, a city’s buildings, a set of knowledge such as jobs in ~n employment agency. Objects – the elements in the particular data base. They could be a relational table, patients’ records. I Representation of domain I Representa ti on of work-base version of domain domain Representation of problem Operations – the computer routines which manipulates the objects. Labels – the letter sequences which activate operators which, together with arguments and syntax, constitute the commands. Work base – in general, people using computer systems for problem solving have had experience of working in a non-computerised work environment either preceding the computerisation or at least in parallel with the computer system. The representation of this experience we call the work-base version. There will be overlap between this and the users representation of the computer’s version of the domain; but there will be differences as well, and these differences we would count as potential sources of interference. There may be differences in ·the underlying structure of the data in the two cases, for example, and will certainly be differences in the objects used. Thus a user found to be indulging in complex checking procedures after using the command FILE turned out to be perplexed that the material filed was still present on the screen. With pieces of paper, things which are filed actually go there rather than being copied. Here are some examples of interference from one of our empirical studies [4]:

Interference on the syntax from other languages. Subject inserts necessary blanks to keep the strings a fixed length.

“Now that’s Matthewson, that’s 4,7, 10 letters, so I want 4 blanks”

types: A+<:S:NAME = ‘MATTHEWSON ‘:>PEOPLE

Generalised interference

“Having learned how reasonably well to manipulate one system, I was presented with a totally different thing which takes months to learn again.”

Interference of other machine characteristics on machine view

“I’m thinking that the bottom line is the line I’m actually going to input. So I couldn’t understand why it wasn’t lit up at the bottom there, because when you’re doing it on (another system) it’s always the bottom line.”

Comment 32

These examples do not do justice to the BIM – see Comment 31. More complete and complex illustrations are required.

End Comment 32

The B.I.M. can be used in two ways. We have illustrated its utility in pinpointing the kinds of interference which can occur from inappropriate kinds of information. We could look at the interactions in just the opposite way and seek ways of maximising the benefits of overlap. This is, of course, the essence of ‘cognitive compatibility’ which we have already mentioned. Trivially, the closer the computer version of the domain maps onto the user’s own version of the domain the better. What is less obviou~ is that any deviations should be systematic where possible.

Comment 33

In complex domains (see Comment 31), the user’s own model is almost always implicit. Modeling that representation is itself non-trivial. A re-published paper would have to make at least a good stab at it.

End Comment 33

In the same way, it is pointless to design half the commands so that they are compatible with the natural language equivalents and use this as a training point if the other half, for no clear reason, deviate from the principle. If there are deviations then they should form a natural sub-class or the compatibility of the other commands will be wasted.

Information Structures

In the block interaction model we leave the blocks ill-defined as far as their content is concerned. Note that we have used individual examples for user protocols as well as general principles in justifying and expanding upon the distinctions we find necessary. What we fail to do in the B. I .M. is to characterise the sum of knowledge which an individual user carries around with him or brings to bear upon the interaction. We have a clear idea of cognitive compatibility at the level of an individual. If this idea is to pay then these structures must be more detailed.

There is no single way of talking about information structures. At one extreme there is the picture of the user’s knowledge as it apparently reveals itself in the interaction; the view, as it were, that the terminal has of its interlocutor. From this point of view the motivation for any key press is irrelevant. This is clearly a gross oversimplification.

The next stage can be achieved by means of a protocol. In it we would wish to separate out those actions which spring from the users concept of the machine and those actions which were a result of him being forced to do something to keep the interaction going. This we call ‘heuristic behaviour’. This can take the form of guessing that the piece of information which is missing will be consistent with some other system or machine. “If in doubt, assume that it is Fortran” would be a good example of this. The user can also attempt to generalise from aspects of the current system he knows about. One example from our study was where the machine apparently failed to provide what the user expected. In fact it had but the information was not what he had expected. The system was ready for another command but the user thought it was in some kind of a pending state, waiting with the information he wanted. In certain other stages – in particular where a command has produced a result which fills up the screen – he had to press the ENTER key – in this case to clear the screen. The user then over-generalised from this to the new situation and pressed the ENTER key again, remarking

“Try pressing ENTER again and see what happens.”

We would not want to count the user’s behaviour in this sequence as representing his knowledge of the system – either correct knowledge or incorrect knowledge. He had to do something and couldn’t think of anything else. When the heuristic behaviour is eliminated we are left with a set of information relevant to the interaction. With respect to the full, ideal set of such information, this will be deficient with respect to the points, at which the user had to trust to heuristic behaviour.

Comment 34

The concept of ‘heuristic behaviour’ has never received the attention that it deserves in HCI research, although it must be recognised that much user interactive behaviour is of this kind. The proliferation of new interactive technologies (see Comment 3) is likely to increase this type of behviour by users attempting to generalise across technologies. A re-published paper would have better to relate the dimension of heuristic to that of correctness both with respect to user knowledge and user behaviour.

End Comment 34

Note that it will also contain incorrect information as well as correct information; all of it would be categorised by the user as what he knew, if not all with complete confidence, certainly with more confidence than his heuristic behaviour. The thing which is missing from B.I.M. and I.S. is any notion of the dynamics of the interaction. We find we need three additional notations at the moment to do this. One of these describes the planning activity of the user, one charts the changes in state of user and machine and one looks at the general cognitive processes which are mobilised.

Comment 35

The list of models required, in addition to the B.I.M. and the I.S. is comprehensive – planning, user-machine state changes, and cognitive processes. However, it might be argued that yet another model is required – one which maps the changes of the domain as a function of the user-computer interactive behaviours. The domain can be modeled as object-attribute-state (or value) changes, resulting from user-computer behaviours, supported respectively by user-computer structures. Such models currently exist and could be exploited by any re-published paper.

End Comment 35

Goal Structure Model

The user does some preparatory work before he presses a key. He must formulate some kind of plan, however rudimentary. This plan can be represented, at least partially, as a hierarchical organisation. At the top might be goals such as “Solve problem p” and at the bottom “Get the computer to display Table T”. The Goal Structure model will show the relationships among the goals.

Comment 36

The G.S.M. is a requirement for designing human-computer interactions. However, it needs to be related in turn to the domain model (see Comments 31, 32 and 33). In the example, the document in the G.S.M. is transformed by the interactive user-computer behaviours from ‘unedited’ to ‘edited’. Any hierarchy in the G.S.M. must take account of any other type of hierarchy, for example, ‘natural’, represented in the domain model (see also Comment 35). The whole issue of so-called situated plans a la Suchman would have to be addressed and seriously re-assessed (see also Comment 37).

End Comment 36

This can be compared with the way of structuring the task imposed by the computer. For example, a user’s concept of editing might lead to the goal structure:

Comment 37

HCI research has never recovered from loosing the baby with the bath-water, following Suchman’s proposals concerning so-called ‘situated actions’. Using the G.S.M, a republished paper could bring some much needed order to the concepts of planning. Even the simple examples provided here make clear that such ordering is possible.

End Comment 37

Two problems would arise here. Firstly the new file has to be opened at an ‘unnatural’ place. Secondly the acceptance of the edited text changes from being a part of the editing process to being a part of the filing process.

The goal structure model, then, gives us a way of describing such structural aspects of the user’s performance and the machines requirements. Note that such goals might be created in advance or at the time a node is evaluated. Thus the relationship of the GSM to real time is not simple.

The technique for determining the goal structure may be as simple as asking the user “What are you trying to do right now and why?” This,may be sufficient to reveal procedures which are inappropriate for the program being used.

Comment 38

Complex domain models, for example, of air traffic management and control would require more sophisticated elicitation procedures than simple user questioning. User knowledge, supporting highly skilled and complex tasks is notoriously difficult to pin down, given its implicit nature. So-called ‘domain experts’ would be a possible substitute; but that approach raises problems of its own (for example, when experts disagree). A re-published paper would at least have to recognise this problem.

End Comment 38

State Transition Model

In the course of an interaction with a system a number of changes take place in the state of the machine. At the same time the user’s perception of the machine state is changing. It will happen that the user misjudges the effect of one command and thereafter’ enters others which from an outside point of view seem almost random. Our point is, as before, that the interaction can only be understood from the point of view of the user.

Comment 39

The S.T.M. needs in turn to be related to the domain model (See Comments 31 and 35). These required linkings raise the whole issue of multiple-model re-integration (see also Comment 26).

End Comment 39

This brings us to the third of the dynamic aspects of the interaction: the progress of the user as he learns about the system.

Comment 40

As with the case of ‘heuristic behaviour’, HCI research has never treated seriously enough the issue of ‘user learning’. Most experiments record only initial engagement with an application or at least limited exposure. Observational studies sometimes do better. We are right to claim that users learn (and attempt to generalise). Designers, of course, are doing the same thing, which results in (at least) two moving targets. Given our emphasis on ‘cognitive mismatch’ and the associated concept of ‘interference’, we need to be able to address the issue of user learning in a convincing manner, at least for the purposes in hand.

End Comment 40

Let us explore some ways of representing such changes. Take first of all the state of the computer. This change is a result of user actions and can thus be represented as a sequence of Machine States (M.S.) consequent on user action.

If the interaction is error free, changes in the representations would follow changes in the machine states in a homologous manner. Errors will occur if the actual machine state does not match its representation.

Comment 41

At some stage and for some purpose, the S.T.S surely needs to be related to the G.S.M. (and or the domain model). Such a relationship would raise a number of issues, for example, ‘errors’ (see Comment 9) and the need to integrate multiple-models (see also Comments 26 and 39).

End Comment 41

We will now look at errors made by a user of an interactive data enquiry system. We will see errors which reveal both the inadequate knowledge of the particular machine state or inadequate knowledge of the actions governing transitions between states. The relevant components of the machine are the information on the terminal display and the state of a flag shown at the bottom right hand corner of the display which ‘informs the user of some aspects of the machine state (ENTER … or OUTPUT … ). In addition there is a prompt, “?”, which indicates that the keyboard is free to be used, there is a key labelled ENTER. In the particular example the user wishes to list the blocks of data he has in his workspace. The required sequence of machine states and actions is:

The machine echoes the command and waits with OUTPUT flag showing.

User: “Nothing happening. We’ve got an OUTPUT there in the corner I don’ t know what that means.

The user had no knowledge of MS2: we can hypothesise his representation of the transition to be:

This is the result of an overgeneralisation. Commands are obeyed immediately if the result is short, unless the result is block data of any size. The point of this is that the data may otherwise wipe everything from the screen. With block data the controlling program has no lookahead to check the size and must itself simply demand the block, putting itself in the hands of some other controlling program. We see here then a case where the user needs to have some fairly detailed and otherwise irrelevant information about the workings of the system in order to make sense of (as opposed to learn by rote) a particular restriction.

The user was told how to proceed, types ENTER, and the list of blocks is displayed together with the next prompt. However, further difficulties arise because the list of blocks includes only one name and the user was expecting a longer listing. Consequently he misconstrues the state of the machine. (continuing from previous example)

User types ENTER

Machine replies with block list and prompt.

Flag set to ENTER …

“Ah, good, so we must have got it right then.

A question mark: (the prompt). It doesn’t give me a listing. Try pressing ENTER again and see what happens.”

User types ENTER

“No? Ah, I see. Is that one absolute block, is that the only blocks there are in the workspace?”

This interaction indicates that the user has derived a general rule for the interaction:

“If in doubt press ENTER”

After this the user realises that there was only one name in the list. Unfortunately his second press of the ENTER key has put the machine into Edit mode and the user thinks he is in command mode. As would be expected the results are strange.

At this stage we can show the machine state transitions and the user’s representation together in a single diagram, figure 3.

This might not be elegant but it captures a lot of features of the interaction which might otherwise be missed.

Comment 42

The S.T.M. includes ‘machine states’ and the user’s representation thereof. Differences between the two are likely to identify both errors and cognitive mismatches. However, the consequences – effective or ineffective interactions and domain transformations – are not represented; but need to be related to the G.S.M. ( and the domain model). This raises, yet again, the issue of the relations between multiple-models required in the design process (see Figure 1 and Comments 26 and 39).

End Comment 42

The final model we use calls upon models currently available in cognitive psychology which deal with the dynamics of word recognition and production, language analysis and information storage and retrieval. The use of this model is too complex for us to attempt a summary here.

Comment 43

Address of the I.P.M. is noticeable only by its intended absence. This may have been an appropriate move at the time. However, any re-published paper would have to take the matter further. In so doing, at least the following issues would need to be addressed:

1. The selection of appropriate Psychology/Language I.P.M.s, of which there are very many, all in different states of development and validation (or rejection). (Note Card et al’s synthesis and simplification of such a model in the form of the HIP – see Comment 15).

2. The relation of the I.P.M. to all other models (see Comments 26, 35, 41 and 42).

3. The need to tailor any I.P.M. to the particular domain of concern to any application, for example, air traffic management (see Comments 6 and 39).

4. The level of description of the I.P.M. See also 1. above.

5. The use of any I.P.M. by designers (see Figure 1).

6. The ‘guarantee’ that Psychology brings to such models in the case of their use in design and the nature of its validation.

End Comment 43

Conclusion

We have stressed the shortcomings of what we have called the Industrial Model and have indicated that the new user will deviate considerably from this model. In its place we have suggested an alternative approach involving both empirical evaluations of system use and the systematic development of conceptual analyses appropriate to the domain of person-system interaction. There are, of course, aspects of the I.M. which we have no reason to disagree with, for example, the idea that the computer can beneficially transform the users view of the problems with which he is occupied. However, we would appreciate it if someone would take the trouble to support this point with clear documentation. So far as we can see it is simply asserted.

Comment 44

In the 34 years, following publication of our original paper, numerous industry practitioners, trained in HCI models and methods, would claim to have produced ‘clear documentation’, showing that the ‘computer can beneficially transform the user’s view of the problems with which he is occupied’. This raises the whole (and vexed) question of how HCI has moved on since 1979, both in terms of the number and effectiveness of trained/educated HCI practitioners. HCI community progress, clear to everyone, needs to be contrasted with HCI discipline progress, unclear to some.

End Comment 44

Finally we would like to stress that nothing we have said is meant to be a solution – other than the methods. We do not take sides for example, on the debate as to whether or not interactions should be in natural language – for we think the question itself is a gross oversimplification. What we do know is that natural language interferes with the interaction and that we need to understand the nature of this interference and to discover principled ways of avoiding it.

Comment 45

Natural language understanding and interference smacks of science. Principled ways of avoiding interference smacks of engineering. What is the relationship between the two? What is the rationale for the relationship? What is the added-value to design (see also Comment 15).

End Comment 45

And what we know above all is that the new user is most emphatically not made in the image of the designer.

Comment 46

The original paper essentially conceptualises and illustrates the need for the proposed ‘Framework for HCI’. That was evil, sufficient unto the day thereof. However, what it lacks thirty-four years later is any exemplars, for example, following Kuhn’s requirement for knowledge development and validation. The exemplars would be needed for any re-publication of the paper and would require the complete, coherant and fit-for-purpose – operationalisation, test and generalisation of the Framework, as set out in Figure 1. A busy time for someone……

End Comment 46

References

[1 ] du Boulay, B. and O’Shea, T. Seeing the works: a strategy of teaching interactive programming. Paper presented at Workshop on ‘Computing Skills and Adaptive Systems’, Liverpool, March 1978.

[2] Hammond, N.V., Long, J.B. and Clark, l.A. Introducing the interactive computer at work: the users’ views. Paper presented at Workshop on ‘Computing Skills and Adaptive Systems’, Liverpool, March 1978.

[3] Wilson. T. Choosing social factors which should determine telecommunications hardware design and implementation. Paper presented at Eighth International Symposium on Human Factors in Telecommunications, Cambridge, September 1977.

[4] Documenting Human-computer Mismatch with the occasional interactive user. APU/IBM project report no. 3, MRC Applied Psychology Unit. Cambridge, September 1978.

[5] Hammond, N.V. and Barnard, P.J. An interactive test vehicle for the investigation of man-computer interaction. Paper presented at BPS Mathematical and Statistical Section Meeting on ‘Laboratory Work Achievable only by Using a Computer’, London, September 1978.

[6] An interactive test vehicle for the study of man-computer interaction. APU/IBM project report no. 1,MRC Applied Psychology Unit, Cambridge, September 1978.

[7] Halliday, M.A.K. Notes on transitivity and theme in English. Part 1. Journal of Linguistics, 1967, 3, 199-244.

FIGURE 3: STATE TRANSITION EXAMPLE

There is general agreement that the requirements phase is the foundation upon which the rest of the system development life-cycle is built. Requirements can be divided into different categories – functional and non-functional; also vital and desirable. More specific types of requirements may also be identified, including organisational; user interaction; and interface (1). Of concern here are User Requirements, because although part of the initial phase of the system development cycle, they do not appear to include, explicitly at least, the concept of design problem as such (although they do not exclude it explicitly either).

The omission is important because elsewhere much research claims to be addressing design problems, although it does not appear to include, explicitly at least, the concept of user requirement as such (although it does not exclude it explicitly either). For example, Hill (3) is clear, that her models and method are intended to: ’Support diagnosis of specific design problems and reasoning about potential design solutions’. Stork and Long (6) specifically include design problem in the title of their paper – A Specific Planning and Design Problem in the Home. Likewise, Dowell (2) – Formulating the Cognitive Design Problem of Air Traffic Management. The diagnosis of design problems and the reasoning about potential design solutions are performed by HCI researchers, as part of their attempts to acquire and validate new design knowledge. The question then arises as to what is the relation between user requirements and design problems?

One possible relation is that user requirements and design problems are one and the same thing. That is, there is no difference between them. Although it is not totally clear, Newman (4) might be understood as taking this view: ’Recognising the need for an artifice, and thus identifying a problem in computer systems design whose solution will meet this need (the initial stage of the engineering design process)’. This view, however, is rejected here. Following the HCI Discipline and HCI Design Problem conceptions, in the manner of Hill’s research, a design problem occurs, when actual performance (for example, expressed, following Hill, as Task Quality, User Costs and Computer Costs does not equal (is usually less than) desired performance, expressed in the same way. Alternative, but equally well specified, expressions of performance, might be used here. In contrast, user requirements have no such expression or constraints, even allowing user requirements to conflict or to be obviously unrealisable.

This difference indicates that user requirements and design problems are not one and the same concept. Rather, it suggests that design problems can be expressed as (potential) user requirements, but not vice versa. Salter (5) appears to agree with this asymmetric relationship, although his terms differ. The Specific Requirements Specification (‘design problem’) is an abstraction over the Client Requirements (‘user requirements’). The Specific Artifact Specification (‘design solution’) is an abstraction over the Artifact. The Client Requirements/Artifact relationship is derived and verified empirically. The Specific Requirements Specification/Specific Artifact Specification is derived and verified formally. Salter’s conception is consistent with those proposed for the design research exemplars, which accompany each framework. Note that the Innovation, Art, Applied and Science frameworks have their own ‘problem’, which may or not be expressed as a design problem, in the manner of Craft and Engineering.

Whatever the terms used, however, the general point for HCI research, whatever the approach and whatever the framework, is that differences between User Requirements and Design Problems need to be both explicit and clear.

References

1. Denley and Long (2010) Dialectic Approach to Multidisciplinary Practice in Requirements Engineering

2. Dowell (1998) Formulating the Cognitive Design Problem of Air Traffic Management

3. Hill (2010) Diagnosing Co-ordination problems in the Emergency Management Response to Disasters

4. Newman (1994) A Preliminary Analysis of the Products of HCI Research, Using Proforma Abstarcts

5. Salter (2010) Applying the Conception of HCI Engineering to the Design of Economic Systems

6. Stork and Long (1994) A Specific Planning and Design Problem in the Home: Rationale and a Case-study

I have always argued for the strongest possible relations between HCI research and HCI practice. For example: ‘The HCI discipline can be summarised as: the use of HCI knowledge (acquired by research) to support practices (of design and evaluation) seeking solutions to the general problem of HCI (humans interacting with computers to do something, as desired/ to perform tasks effectively, as desired) (1). My own research (along with many others) has acquired such knowledge (in my case) in the form of design models, methods and principles to support practice.

However, I have always been acutely aware of the gap between knowledge acquired by HCI research and its application by designers. Bellotti reported empirical support for such a gap in her study of commercial system interface design projects (2). She concluded that: ‘The study suggests that HCI design and evaluation techniques, although potentially valuable to commercial design, are not applied in practice’. A comparable study of London HCI Centre designers (the commercial arm of the Ergonomics Unit) reached the same conclusion. Later, in 1997, I cited Bellotti’s paper, concluding that: ‘In terms of the capability maturity model (3), HCI fails to support design practices, which are either ‘defined’, ‘repeatable’, ‘managed’ or ‘optimised’.

My view has remained unchanged, in spite of the intervening years. In my 2010 Festschrift, I wrote: ‘….I would like to celebrate the world of HCI. Obviously, students, practitioners and researchers, who identify themselves with HCI and who together make up the HCI community. But also IT professionals, outside the community, who do not identify with HCI; but who actually design so many of the interfaces in use to-day. Most IT interfaces continue to be designed and implemented by such professionals. We forget them at our (professional) peril.’

Further, I expressed the hope that: ‘HCI research improves the effectiveness of the design knowledge, which it acquires to support HCI design practices (a hope shared by festschrift authors – knowledge, which is ‘more assured’ (Carroll), ‘more reliable’ (Dix) and ‘offering a better guarantee’ (Hill)). Anyone who doubts this need should seriously consider:

1. How much interface design is performed by IT professionals, outside the HCI community;

2. How little HCI actual design, as opposed to related studies or evaluation, is carried out by individual HCI practitioners (as consultants) or even by those working as teams in large organisations; and

3. How much design is performed with little or no reference to HCI design knowledge (of any or no conception), other than perhaps evaluation. But how is this much-needed improvement in HCI design knowledge to be achieved? In my view, it can only come about, if HCI research and practice diagnose more design problems and prescribe more design solutions and in so doing evaluate the effectiveness of HCI design knowledge (of whatever kind).’

However, lots of HCI water has passed under the bridge in the last 25 years or so. Also, I am a researcher and not a practising designer. A timely reconsideration of the relations between HCI research and practice – past, present and future, seemed a good idea for the website to address. By sheer good fortune, I was in contact with Victoria Bellotti at this time and she agreed to an e-mail exchange on the topic. Victoria is both a very successful researcher and designer and, of course, set the ball rolling in 1988 with her paper cited earlier. We should be so lucky.

Bellotti, 1988

Carroll, 2010

Dix, 2010

Hill, 2010

Long, 2010

Long and Dowell, 1989

Paulk et al., 1993

I have always argued for the strongest possible relations between HCI research and HCI practice. For example: ‘The HCI discipline can be summarised as: the use of HCI knowledge (acquired by research) to support practices (of design and evaluation) seeking solutions to the general problem of HCI (humans interacting with computers to do something, as desired/ to perform tasks effectively, as desired) (1). My own research (along with many others) has acquired such knowledge (in my case) in the form of design models, methods and principles to support practice.

However, I have always been acutely aware of the gap between knowledge acquired by HCI research and its application by designers. Bellotti reported empirical support for such a gap in her study of commercial system interface design projects (2). She concluded that: ‘The study suggests that HCI design and evaluation techniques, although potentially valuable to commercial design, are not applied in practice’. A comparable study of London HCI Centre designers (the commercial arm of the Ergonomics Unit) reached the same conclusion. Later, in 1997, I cited Bellotti’s paper, concluding that: ‘In terms of the capability maturity model (3), HCI fails to support design practices, which are either ‘defined’, ‘repeatable’, ‘managed’ or ‘optimised’.

My view has remained unchanged, in spite of the intervening years. In my 2010 Festschrift, I wrote: ‘….I would like to celebrate the world of HCI. Obviously, students, practitioners and researchers, who identify themselves with HCI and who together make up the HCI community. But also IT professionals, outside the community, who do not identify with HCI; but who actually design so many of the interfaces in use to-day. Most IT interfaces continue to be designed and implemented by such professionals. We forget them at our (professional) peril.’

Further, I expressed the hope that: ‘HCI research improves the effectiveness of the design knowledge, which it acquires to support HCI design practices (a hope shared by festschrift authors – knowledge, which is ‘more assured’ (Carroll), ‘more reliable’ (Dix) and ‘offering a better guarantee’ (Hill)). Anyone who doubts this need should seriously consider:

1. How much interface design is performed by IT professionals, outside the HCI community;

2. How little HCI actual design, as opposed to related studies or evaluation, is carried out by individual HCI practitioners (as consultants) or even by those working as teams in large organisations; and

3. How much design is performed with little or no reference to HCI design knowledge (of any or no conception), other than perhaps evaluation. But how is this much-needed improvement in HCI design knowledge to be achieved? In my view, it can only come about, if HCI research and practice diagnose more design problems and prescribe more design solutions and in so doing evaluate the effectiveness of HCI design knowledge (of whatever kind).’

However, lots of HCI water has passed under the bridge in the last 25 years or so. Also, I am a researcher and not a practising designer. A timely reconsideration of the relations between HCI research and practice – past, present and future, seemed a good idea for the website to address. By sheer good fortune, I was in contact with Victoria Bellotti at this time and  she agreed to an e-mail exchange on the topic. Victoria is both a very successful researcher and designer and, of course, set the ball rolling in 1988 with her paper cited earlier. We should be so lucky.

 

Bellotti, 1988

Carroll, 2010

Dix, 2010

Hill, 2010

Long, 2010

Long and Dowell, 1989

Paulk et al., 1993

References

1. Denley and Long (2010) Dialectic Approach to Multidisciplinary Practice in Requirements Engineering

2. Dowell (1998) Formulating the Cognitive Design Problem of Air Traffic Management

3. Hill (2010) Diagnosing Co-ordination problems in the Emergency Management Response to Disasters

4. Newman (1994) A Preliminary Analysis of the Products of HCI Research, Using Proforma Abstarcts

5. Salter (2010) Applying the Conception of HCI Engineering to the Design of Economic Systems

6. Stork and Long (1994) A Specific Planning and Design Problem in the Home: Rationale and a Case-study

[1] Long and Dowell, 1989

[2] Bellotti, 1988

[3] Paulk et al., 1993

[4] Long, 2010

[5] Dix, 2010

[6] Carroll, 2010

[7] Hill, 2010